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M	y	mother	died	on	November	30,	2007	—	suddenly	and	unex-pectedly	at	the	age	of	55.	In	light	of	her	death,	I	immediately	experienced	intense	grief.	And	this	seems	as	it	should	be:	
my	reason	for	grief	was	that	my	mother	had	died,	not	exactly	young,	
but	too	young.	Indeed,	if	I	had	not	experienced	such	grief,	something	
would	have	been	wrong	with	me.	Contrast	me	with	Camus’s	character	
Meursault	in	The Stranger	who,	a	day	after	his	mother’s	funeral,	goes	to	
the	movies	with	a	new	love	interest	(1942/1988).
Yet	now,	many	years	later,	I	experience	hardly	any	grief	at	all.	This,	
too,	seems	as	it	should	be.	In	“Mourning	and	Melancholia,”	Freud	puts	
it	with	apparent	simplicity:	
[A]lthough	mourning	involves	grave	departures	from	the	
normal	attitude	to	life,	it	never	occurs	to	us	to	regard	it	as	
a	pathological	condition	and	 to	 refer	 it	 to	medical	 treat-
ment.	We	rely	on	its	being	overcome	after	a	certain	lapse	
of	time.	(1917/1999,	243–4)1 
In	a	 similar	vein,	DSM-5,	our	 contemporary	 standard	 for	 classifying	
mental	illnesses,	states:	
The	 dysphoria	 in	 grief	 is	 likely	 to	 decrease	 in	 intensity	
over	 days	 to	 weeks	 and	 occurs	 in	 waves,	 the	 so-called	
pangs	of	grief.	(American	Psychiatric	Association	2013)
Yet	upon	reflection,	the	diminution	of	grief	is	puzzling.	My	grief	has	
passed,	almost	entirely.	But	my	mother’s	death	has	not	been	undone.	
Yet	if	my	grief	was	a	rational	response	to	her	death,	and	if	her	death	re-
mains	the	same	over	time,	then,	it	seems,	I	am	failing	to	be	responsive	
to	my	reasons.
This	gives	rise	to	a	puzzle:	Grief	is,	plausibly,	a	response	to	reasons;	
the	 reason	 for	my	grief	was	my	mother’s	death;	her	death	does	not	
change	over	time;	but	it	is	not	wrong	for	me	to	grieve	less	over	time.	
1.	 I	 take	 “mourning”	 and	 “grief”	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 same	 emotion	—	what	 in	Ger-
man	 is	 rendered	as	 “Trauer.”	My	 interest	 is	 in	 the	emotional	experience	of	
grief	—	paradigmatically	of	being	sad	—	and	not	in	the	practice	of	grieving.	
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However,	 I	did	recover.	And	I	was	surprised	by	how	quickly	this	
happened	and	how	thorough	the	recovery	was.	Yet	I’d	like	to	think	that	
this	does	not	reflect	a	peculiar	callousness	on	my	part	but	is	a	common	
phenomenon.	Empirical	studies	have	shown	that	we	typically	come	to	
terms	with	others’	deaths,	and	many	other	misfortunes,	surprisingly	
quickly.4	Here	is	how	George	Bonanno,	a	leading	researcher	on	grief,	
puts	it	at	the	opening	of	his	book	The Other Side of Sadness:	
The	 good	news	 is	 that	 for	most	 of	 us,	 grief	 is	 not	 over-
whelming	or	unending.	As	frightening	as	the	pain	of	loss	
can	be,	most	of	us	are	resilient.	Some	of	us	cope	so	effec-
tively,	in	fact,	we	hardly	seem	to	miss	a	beat	in	our	day-to-
day	lives.	We	may	be	shocked,	even	wounded,	by	a	loss,	
but	we	still	manage	to	regain	our	equilibrium	and	move	
on….	[Bereavement]	is	something	we	are	wired	for,	and	it	
is	certainly	not	meant	to	overwhelm	us.	Rather,	our	reac-
tions	to	grief	seem	designed	to	help	us	accept	and	accom-
modate	losses	relatively	quickly	so	that	we	can	continue	
to	live	productive	lives.	(2009,	7–8)
For	what	 it’s	worth,	 this	 is	 true	 to	my	experience.	However,	 it	 is	
something	that	surprised	me.	I	was	surprised	that	only	a	 few	weeks	
after	my	mother’s	death,	I	could	lead	my	life	more	or	less	exactly	as	I	
did	before	her	death:	I	hardly	missed	a	beat!	I	was	also	surprised	that	
my	grief	 seemed	 to	disappear	 almost	 completely	—	just	 as	Bonanno	
describes:	
The	fact	is	that	most	of	the	time,	there	is	no	hidden	grief.	
There	may	be	lingering	questions	about	the	relationship,	
or	 changes	wrought	by	 the	death	may	have	 to	be	dealt	
4.	 See,	for	instance,	Bonanno	et al (2005)	and	the	extensive	references	in	Bonan-
no	(2009),	as	well	as	the	discussion	in	Moller	(2007).	However,	I	do	not	pro-
pose	to	pursue	the	empirical	question	of	whether	grief	really	diminishes	as	
quickly	as	Bonanno	and	others	argue.	My	methodology	in	this	essay	is	that	
of	phenomenology	not	of	empirical	psychology;	hence	the	focus	on	the	first	
person.	
Yet	how	could	the	diminution	of	grief	not	be	wrong,	if	my	reason	for	
grief	stays	the	same?	Do	reasons	for	grief	expire?
In	what	follows,	I	will	first	clarify	the	puzzle.	I	will	then	consider	
four	possible	responses.	Finally,	I	will	argue	that	the	puzzle	eludes	a	
solution,	but	that	there	are	principled	reasons	for	why	that	is	so.2
My	topic	in	this	paper	is	grief.	However,	the	phenomenon	I	am	in-
terested	in	—	the	rationality	of	accommodation	to	a	loss	and	also	injus-
tice	—	arises	not	just	for	grief	but	for	many	other	emotions,	including,	
paradigmatically,	anger,	indignation	and	guilt.	Here	I	wish	to	focus	on	
grief	as	a	case	study,	and	I	leave	discussion	of	our	emotional	response	
to	injustice	for	another	occasion.3
1. Clarifying the Puzzle
In	this	section,	I	would	like	to	make	the	puzzle	I	just	sketched	more	
vivid	and	also	clarify	 some	aspects	of	 it.	What	 I	hope	 to	make	plau-
sible	 is	 that	 the	puzzle	 is	especially	pressing	when	considered	 from	
a	first-person	perspective	—	from	the	perspective	of	 the	griever	who	
anticipates	the	diminution	of	her	grief	or	someone	who	reflects	upon	
the	diminution	of	her	grief	in	retrospect.	I	will	also	consider	why	the	
puzzle	might	be	overlooked	and	how	we	are	to	understand	the	object	
of	grief.
1.1 Surprise, Anticipation, Retrospection
To	make	 the	puzzle	 vivid,	 I	will	 start	by	describing	how	 the	puzzle	
initially	struck	me.
	When	my	mother	died	and	I	initially	felt	intense	grief,	it	seemed	to	
me	that	I	would	never	fully	recover.	I	was	convinced,	perhaps	naïvely,	
that	my	life	would	always	be	infused	with	pain	over	her	death.	
2.	 Although	there	 is	a	 large	 literature	on	grief,	 I	 take	 the	puzzle	 I	describe	 to	
be	 novel.	 I	 discuss	 some	 of	 the	 literature	 in	 what	 follows.	 Moller	 (2007)	
and	Nussbaum	(2001,	ch.1)	have	been	especially	influential	in	my	thinking.	
Moller	 (forthcoming),	which	came	 to	my	attention	only	as	 this	 article	was	
going	to	press,	offers	considerations	that	are	congenial	to	the	present	line	of	
argument.
3.	 Marušić	(in	preparation).
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our	loss.	Proust	puts	it	well	in	a	famous	passage	from	Within a Budding 
Grove:
Our	dread	of	a	future	in	which	we	must	forego	the	sight	
of	faces	and	the	sound	of	voices	which	we	love	and	from	
which	 today	 we	 derive	 our	 dearest	 joy,	 this	 dread,	 far	
from	being	dissipated,	is	intensified,	if	to	the	pain	of	such	
a	privation	we	feel	that	there	will	be	added	what	seems	
to	us	now	in	anticipation	more	painful	still:	not	to	feel	it	
as	a	pain	at	all	—	to	remain	indifferent.	(1919/1998,	340)6
When	we	grieve,	the	thought	that	we	will	stop	grieving	strikes	us	as	
the	thought	that	we	will	no	longer	care	—	that,	in	time,	we	will	become	
indifferent	 to	 it.	 This	 is	 unproblematic,	 and	 even	 comforting,	when	
we	are	upset	over	something	that,	as	we	understand,	we	won’t	have	
reason	to	care	about	anymore	—	for	instance,	the	end	of	a	bad	relation-
ship	or	a	ruined	shirt.	But	the	death	of	a	loved	one	is	different.	When	
we	anticipate	that	the	object	of	our	grief	will	continue	to	matter	—	for	
instance,	when	we	think	that	we	will	continue	to	love	the	other	—	the	
thought	that	our	grief	will	diminish	strikes	us	as	a	failure	on	our	part.7 
The	 fact	 that	 the	 anticipation	of	 the	 end	of	 grief,	 rather	 than	be-
ing	a	source	of	comfort,	is	something	that	we	shrink	from,	illuminates	
my	puzzle:	If,	in	grieving,	we	understand	that	our	loss	will	continue	
to	matter,	we	anticipate	the	end	of	grief	as	a	failure	to	adequately	re-
spond	to	our	reasons.	I	take	this	to	be	an	insight	suggested	by	Proust	
6.	 Thanks	to	Richard	Moran	and	Nicholas	Riggle	for	pointing	me	to	this	passage.	
Moller	(2007,	312)	also	discusses	the	passage.	He	accepts	Proust’s	point	and	
argues	that	our	resilience	in	the	face	of	loss	is	to	be	understood	as	a	form	of	
blindness	to	the	significance	of	loss.
7.	 Preston-Roedder	and	Preston-Roedder	 (2017)	 argue	 that	we	have	different	
ways	in	which	we	can	“stand	in	solidarity”	with	the	dead	loved	one,	even	if	
we	don’t	experience	grief.	Even	if	correct,	I	think	that	this	view	cannot	help	us	
make	sense	of	the	end	of	grief.	In	fact,	it	seems	to	me	—	though	I	am	certain	
that	many	will	disagree	—	that	these	alternative	ways	of	standing	in	solidarity	
with	the	dead	are,	in	effect,	attempts	to	cling	to	diminishing	grief.	Indeed,	if	
we	had	alternative,	equally	good	ways	of	standing	in	solidarity	with	the	dead,	
why	should	we	grieve	at	all?
with,	but	usually	when	grief	has	come	and	gone,	that’s	it.	
Even	if	the	anguish	was	short-lived,	most	of	the	time	all	
that	means	is	that	the	person	has	managed	her	or	his	grief	
effectively	and	is	moving	on	with	life.	(22)	
It	surprised	me	that	 there	wasn’t	hidden	grief	—	or	at	any	rate	much	
less	than	I	initially	believed	there	would	be.
This,	then,	gave	rise	to	a	puzzle:	In	my	initial	experience	of	grief,	
I	 (naïvely)	 expected	my	 grief	 to	 continue,	 because	 I	 thought	 of	my	
mother’s	 death	 as	my	 reason	 for	 grief.	 In	 grieving,	 it	 seemed	 to	me	
that	my	grief	would	continue	for	as	long	as	her	death	was	a	reason	to	
grieve	—	that	is,	as	long	as	she	continued	to	matter	to	me.	This	is	why	
I	was	surprised	at	the	rapid	diminution	and	the	eventual	end	of	grief:	I	
stopped	grieving,	even	though	she	did	not	stop	mattering	to	me.
Here	is	another	way	to	articulate	this	point:	Robert	Solomon	said	
that	grief	is	the	continuation	of	love.5	I	think	that	this	captures	my	ex-
perience	of	grief	quite	well:	 I	 took	grief	 to	be	a	manifestation	of	my	
love	for	my	mother.	And	I	 thought	I	would	love	her	 for	as	 long	as	I	
shall	live	—	or	at	least	for	longer	than	a	few	weeks.	That	is	why	I	did	
not	think	that	my	grief	would	diminish	so	quickly.	But	it	did	diminish,	
and	eventually	it	ended,	and	I	struggle	to	understand	how	that	can	be,	
since,	I’d	like	to	think,	my	love	continues.
I	was	 surprised	 by	 the	 temporality	 of	my	 grief,	 because	 I	 hadn’t	
grieved	before,	at	least	not	in	a	way	that	the	importance	of	my	loss	so	
clearly	outlived	my	grief.	However,	I	probably	should	have	known	bet-
ter,	since	there	was	plenty	of	evidence	about	how	other	people	experi-
ence	loss.	For	the	less	naïve,	my	puzzle	will	therefore	arise	differently.	
It	will	arise	in	anticipation	of	the	diminution	of	grief.	
Indeed,	it	is	the	anticipation	of	the	diminution	of	grief	that	makes	
my	puzzle	most	vivid.	When	we	anticipate	the	diminution	of	grief,	it	
seems	to	us	that,	 in	time,	we	will	no	longer	care	about	our	 loss.	Yet	
this	 is	 jarring	when	we	also	anticipate	 the	continued	 importance	of	
5.	 As	Higgins	(2013,	159)	reports,	Solomon	says	this	in	his	unpublished	lecture	
“Good	Grief.”	In	True to Our Feelings,	he	says,	“Grief	is	…	a	way	of	keeping	the	
love	alive”	(2007,	74).
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My	puzzle	arises	because	it	is	difficult	in	retrospect	to	identify	the	
reasons	 in	 light	 of	which	 it	would	make	 sense	 to	 grieve	 less.	 In	 an	
effort	to	explain	why	we	grieve	less,	we	seem	to	reach	for	the	wrong	
kind	of	reasons.	That	is	because	the	diminution	of	grief	does	not	seem	
to	be	primarily	a	response	to	a	change	in	the	significance	or	value	of	
the	loss	but	is,	rather,	occasioned	by	the	needs	of	the	griever.	Yet	this	
makes	it	hard	to	understand	the	diminution	of	grief	as	a	response	to	
reasons	—	since	the	reasons	for	grief	are	not	provided	by	the	needs	of	
the	 griever.	 To	 compare:	 If	 it	were	 shown	 that	we	 disbelieve	 some-
thing	because	it	is	bad	for	us	to	believe	it,	wouldn’t	this	reveal	that	we	
are,	precisely,	not	responsive	to	our	reasons?
A	similar	point	applies	to	a	frequent	response	to	my	puzzle.	People	
say:	As	time	passes,	we	have	to	face	life	again;	we	have	to	attend	to	
our	children,	do	our	jobs,	and	take	care	of	ourselves	—	and	this	some-
how	makes	the	diminution	of	grief	intelligible.	The	difficulty	with	this	
response	is	that	it	seems	to	appeal	to	the	wrong	kind	of	reasons.	The	
fact	that	I	have	to	carry	on	with	my	life	—	attend	to	my	children,	do	my	
job	and	take	care	of	myself	—	is	a	reason	of	the	wrong	kind;	it	merely	
shows	 that	 it	would	be	 important	 for	me	not	 to	grieve.	Also,	 it	may	
explain	 why	 I	 experience	 less	 grief	—	why	my	 attention	 shifts	 from	
my	mother	to	other	matters	—	but	it	does	not	provide	a	reason	for	the	
diminution	of	grief.	Indeed,	it	seems	that	the	only	reason	that	would	
be	of	the	right	kind	is	a	reason	that	would	show	that	my	mother	did	
not	die	after	all,	or	that	her	death	no	longer	matters	as	much.	But	this	
does	not	seem	to	be	the	case	here;	my	grief	diminished,	even	though	
I	continue	to	care.	But	if	the	loss	still	matters	to	me	—	how	could	it	be	
all	right	not	to	grieve?
1.2 Adjustment and Detachment
I	acknowledge	that	the	puzzle	I	described	is	elusive.	I	think	that	this	is	
so,	because	there	are	two	reasons	that	make	sense	of	the	diminution	of	
grief	to	some	extent,	but	not	entirely.	But	because	they	make	sense	of	
the	diminution	of	grief	to	some	extent,	they	obscure	the	puzzle.	
(even	if	it	is	not	quite	what	he	had	in	mind).	However,	it	is	important	
to	note	that	this	insight	holds	only	of	cases	in	which	we	anticipate	the	
continuation	of	love.	When	we	don’t	—	when	we	are	upset	over	some-
thing	that,	we	realize,	won’t	continue	to	matter	to	us	—	we	may	well	
look	forward	to	a	time	when	we	won’t	have	any	more	reason	to	grieve.	
Or,	when	we	experience	grief	over	something	that	we	recognize	as	not	
being	of	value	—	an	unrealized	holiday	crush,	say	—	we	can	see	the	end	
of	grief	as	a	return	to	reason.	
The	anticipation	of	the	diminution	of	grief	is,	I	think,	the	most	vivid	
way	to	feel	the	force	of	my	puzzle.	However,	there	is	another	way:	It	
is	to	consider	how	we	could	make	sense	of	the	diminution	of	grief	in	
retrospect.	
I	 realize	 that	 when	my	mother	 died,	 I	 had	 very	 good	 reason	 to	
grieve.	I	also	acknowledge	that	today,	a	decade	after	her	death,	I	am	
not	wrong	 not	 to	 grieve.	 But	 I	 find	 it	 puzzling	why	 this	 should	 be	
so	—	since	it	does	not	seem	that	her	death	is	any	less	of	a	loss.
The	main	reason	why	my	grief	diminished	so	quickly	seems	to	be	
that	I	simply	had	to	move	on.	Intense	grief	is	hard	to	bear	and	is	a	ma-
jor	disruption	to	life.	If	my	initial	grief	had	not	diminished	significantly	
and	quickly,	I	would	have	gone	to	pieces.	That	is	why	it	makes	very	
good	sense	that	my	grief	would	diminish	and	that	I	would	be	wired	
in	a	way	for	this	to	be	so.	The	trouble	is	that	this	is	no	reason	for	grief	
to	diminish,	since,	at	best,	it	is	a	reason	of	the	wrong	kind.8	I	did	not	
grieve	because	grieving	was	somehow	good	for	me.	I	grieved	because	
my	mother	had	died.	Considerations	showing	that	 it	 is	good	or	bad	
for	me	to	grieve	are	like	considerations	showing	that	it	is	good	or	bad	
to	believe	something:	they	may	make	sense	of	why	someone	believes	
something,	but	not	in	a	way	that	renders	the	belief	intelligible	to	the	
believer.	The	goodness	or	badness	of	grief	has	something	to	do	with	
me,	the	griever.	But	my	grief	was	not	about	me;	my	grief	was	my	re-
sponse	to	my	mother’s	death.	
8.	 See	D’Arms	and	Jacobson	(2000,	77)	for	a	point	in	this	vein	about	grief	and	
Hieronymi	(2005;	2013)	for	an	account	of	the	wrong	kind	of	reasons	that	I	
find	convincing.	
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itself	is	a	large	part	of	what	constitutes	the	diminution	of	
grief.	(2001,	82)
Nussbaum	identifies	two	reasons	that	make	sense	of	diminished	grief:	
the	 griever’s	 adjustment	 to	 her	 loved	 one’s	 death	 and	 the	 griever’s	
gradual	detachment	from	her.10	And	I	think	that	she	is	right	about	both.	
However,	I	don’t	think	this	is	all	there	is.
Here	is	why,	despite	Nussbaum’s	insights,	 I	 think	that	the	puzzle	
persists.	 Even	 though	 the	 diminution	 of	 grief	 makes	 limited	 sense	
in	light	of	our	adjustment	to	the	other’s	death	—	especially	when	the	
death	was	unexpected	—	grief	is	not	primarily	a	response	to	the	unex-
pectedness	or	suddenness	of	the	other’s	death,	but	to	her	death	itself.	
That	is	why	one’s	adjustment	does	not	significantly	bear	on	whether	
one	has	less	reason	to	grieve	over	time.	To	the	extent	that	it	bears	on	it,	
it	does	so	insofar	as	grief	is	a	response	to	the	time	or	circumstances	of	
the	other’s	death,	rather	than	to	the	death	itself.
Nussbaum’s	second	point	—	that	over	 time	the	 loved	one	matters	
less	to	us	—	may	identify	a	good	reason	for	the	diminution	of	grief.	Yet	
even	if	it	does,	this	does	not	seem	reason	enough.	Although	my	moth-
er’s	role	in	my	life	is	very	different	today	than	when	she	died,	and	even	
though	in	a	salient	sense	she	matters	less	to	me	today	than	she	did	a	
decade	ago,	my	love	did	not	disappear	as	quickly	and	as	thoroughly	as	
my	grief.	My	grief	started	diminishing	very	shortly	after	her	death	and	
its	diminution	was	rapid	and	complete.	Yet	I	love	her	more	and	longer	
than	is	reflected	in	my	grief.	It	is	the	discrepancy	between	the	duration	
of	grief	and	the	extent	to	which	the	loved	one	matters	to	us	that	gives	
rise	to	the	puzzle	—	even	if	we	acknowledge	that	over	time	the	dead	
do,	in	fact,	come	to	matter	less.
Indeed,	 it	 remains	 puzzling	 to	 me	 why	 Nussbaum’s	 second	
point	—	that	 her	 mother	 plays	 a	 less	 central	 role	 in	 her	 flourish-
ing	—	would	not	constitute	a	reason	for	an	 intensification,	rather	than	
the	diminution,	of	grief.	After	all,	isn’t	it	a	further	loss,	in	addition	to	
10.	 I	take	Nussbaum’s	saying	that	some	of	her	value	judgments	change	tense	to	
reflect	the	fact	that	her	mother	comes	to	matter	less.
The	first	 reason	 is	 that	grief	may	 involve	an	element	of	shock	or	
surprise,	especially	if	a	loved	one’s	death	was	unexpected,	and	this	is	
something	that	one	adjusts	to	fairly	quickly.	The	second	is	that	over	
time	 the	dead	 loved	one	does	 lose	significance	 in	one’s	 life.	Martha	
Nussbaum	brings	out	both	points	in	her	poignant	reflections	on	the	
diminution	of	her	grief	over	her	mother’s	death:9
When	I	receive	the	knowledge	of	my	mother’s	death,	the	
wrenching	character	of	that	knowledge	comes	in	part	from	
the	fact	that	it	violently	tears	the	fabric	of	hope,	planning,	
and	expectation	that	I	have	built	up	around	her	all	my	life.	
But	when	the	knowledge	of	her	death	has	been	with	me	
for	a	 long	time,	 I	 reorganize	my	other	beliefs	about	 the	
present	and	future	to	accord	with	it.	I	no	longer	have	the	
belief	that	I	will	see	my	mother	at	Thanksgiving	dinner;	I	
no	longer	think	of	the	end	of	a	busy	day	as	a	time	when	
I	can	call	her	up	and	enjoy	a	long	talk;	I	no	longer	think	
of	a	trip	abroad	as	an	occasion	to	buy	presents	for	her;	I	
no	 longer	 expect	 to	make	happy	plans	 to	 celebrate	her	
birthday.	(2001,	80)
I	will	 still	 accept	many	of	 the	same	 judgments	—	includ-
ing	judgments	about	my	mother’s	death,	about	her	worth	
and	importance,	about	the	badness	of	what	happened	to	
her.	But	propositions	having	to	do	with	the	central	role	
of	my	mother	 in	my	own	conception	of	flourishing	will	
shift	into	the	past	tense.	By	now,	in	August	2000,	it	is	no	
longer	as	true	of	me	as	it	was	in	1992,	that	“my	mother	is	
an	important	element	in	my	flourishing”;	I	am	now	more	
inclined	to	accept	the	proposition,	“The	person	who	died	
was	a	central	part	of	my	life,”	and	this	judgmental	change	
9.	 This	discussion	is	anticipated	in	Nussbaum’s	The Therapy of Desire	(1994,	375–
89).	See	also	her	recent	Anger and Forgiveness	for	the	contrast	between	grief	
and	anger	(2016,	126).	
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reason	has	its	strength	or	significance.12	 Indeed,	sometimes	we	have	
reason	to	grieve	for	those	to	whom	we	stand	in	no	significant	relation-
ship.	As	an	anonymous	reviewer	puts	it:	“I	might	for	instance	look	at	a	
picture	of	a	child’s	corpse	in	the	arms	of	a	crushed	and	grieving	mother,	
perhaps	in	new	photos	of	the	aftermath	of	an	errant	Hellfire	missile	
attack,	and	be	struck	with	grief.	Would	this	be	unreasonable?	I	think	
not,	even	though	the	loss	is	not	in	any	distinctive	sense	mine.”	Agreed.	
No	particular	relationship	to	the	dead	child	is	required	for	reasonable	
grief.13
I	conclude	that	grief	often,	but	not	always,	involves	partiality:	the	
deaths	of	those	with	whom	we	stand	in	close	relationships	present	us	
with	different	and	more	significant	reasons	to	grieve	than	the	deaths	
of	 those	with	whom	we	 don’t	 stand	 in	 any	 particular	 relationships.	
However,	this	does	not	mean	that	grief	is,	after	all,	about	us	or	about	
our	relationships	rather	than	about	those	who	died.	In	due	course,	I	
will	return	to	this	point	to	consider	whether	the	temporality	of	grief	
could	be	understood	by	analogy	to	its	partiality.
1.4 Desiderata for a Solution
I	conclude	this	section	by	identifying	two	desiderata	for	a	solution	to	
my	puzzle:	A	solution	would	explain	how,	as	grievers,	we	are	to	antici-
pate	the	diminution	of	grief	in	a	way	that	makes	sense	to	us	—	but	with-
out	invoking	the	wrong	kind	of	reasons.	Relatedly,	a	solution	would	
explain	how	we	are	 to	understand	 in	 retrospect	why	we	grieve	 less	
and	why	we	may	eventually	stop	grieving	altogether	—	again	without	
12.	 I	propose	 to	understand	 the	 relationship	 to	 the	dead	 loved	one	as	what	 is	
sometimes	called	a	background	condition	for	a	reason	(see	Pettit	and	Smith	
(1990),	Dancy	(2000,	127–8),	Schroeder	(2007,	23–40),	and	especially	Keller	
(2013)).	I	hold	that	Cholbi	(2017,	258)	mistakes	a	background	condition	for	
a	reason	with	the	reason	itself	when	he	argues	that	the	object	of	grief	is	the	
relationship	to	the	dead,	on	the	grounds	that	we	only	have	reason	to	grieve	
for	those	with	whom	we	stand	in	the	relevant	relationships.	
13.	 I	may	simply	stand	in	a	basic	“moral	relationship”	to	the	child	in	which	I	stand	
to	all	fellow	human	beings	(Scanlon	2013,	90),	so	that	the	relationship	plays	a	
crucial	role	after	all:	this	relationship,	too,	may	determine	the	significance	of	
my	reason	for	grief.	
her	mother’s	 being	 dead,	 that	 her	mother	 no	 longer	 plays	 this	 cen-
tral	role?	For	what	it’s	worth,	I	have	been	struck	by	the	thought	that	
it	should	be	distressing	that	my	mother	is	no	longer	a	central	part	of	
my	life	—	for	instance,	when	she	missed	the	birth	of	her	grandchildren.	
Why	shouldn’t	this	provide	further	reasons	for	grief?	This	is	another	
case	in	which	my	experience	of	grief	struck	me	as	incongruent	with	
the	reasons	in	light	of	which	grief	would	make	sense.11
1.3 The Object of Grief
The	preceding	discussion	makes	clear	that,	to	understand	the	diminu-
tion	of	grief,	it	is	important	to	be	clear	about	the	object	of	grief.	Let	me	
clarify	how	I	propose	to	understand	it.	
Grief	is	a	response	to	loss.	In	the	case	at	hand,	my	loss	is	my	moth-
er’s	death.	It	is	to	her	death	that	I	respond	with	grief,	and	it	is	her	death	
that	is	the	primary	object	of	my	grief.	(More	precisely,	it	 is	her	being 
dead,	rather	than	the	event	of	her	dying).	However,	my	grief	may	con-
currently	have	other	objects,	such	as	the	circumstances	of	her	dying,	
the	end	of	an	ongoing	relationship	with	her,	or	the	deprivation	to	my-
self.	In	contrast,	in	grieving	over	the	breakup	of	a	relationship,	the	pri-
mary	object	of	grief	—	the	 loss	—	is,	precisely,	 the	end	of	an	ongoing	
relationship.	This	brings	out	a	deep	difference	between	grief	over	a	
breakup	and	grief	over	a	loved	one’s	death.	When	I	grieve	in	light	of	a	
breakup,	I	grieve	for us (who	no	longer	have	an	ongoing	relationship),	
or	for myself	(who	no	longer	has	a	companion).	But	when	I	grieve	in	
light	of	a	loved	one’s	death,	I	grieve	for the other.
Nonetheless,	it	is	clear	that	when	we	grieve	for	a	dead	loved	one,	
our	 relationship	 to	 her	matters	 a	 great	 deal.	 That	 is	 because	 the	 re-
lationship	 to	 the	dead	 at	 least	 partly	 determines	 the	 significance	of	
our	 reasons	 to	 grieve.	 For	 example,	 it	 is	 in	 virtue	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 it	
was	my	mother	 who	 died	 that	 I	 have	 particularly	 strong	 reason	 to	
grieve	—	more	 reason	 than	a	 friend	or	a	 stranger.	However,	 the	 rela-
tionship	is	not	itself	my	reason;	rather,	it	is	that	in	virtue	of	which	my	
11.	 I	am	indebted	to	Faye	Halpern	for	discussion	of	this	issue.	
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a	fever	does	not	make	such	a	question	applicable:	There	is	no	reason	
in	light	of	which	we	suffer	from	a	fever	—	though,	of	course,	there	is	
a	reason	why	we	suffer	from	the	fever,	an	explanatory	reason.	Hence,	
the	way	in	which	we	make	sense	of	grief	is	different	from	the	way	in	
which	we	make	sense	of	conditions	that	befall	us.17
A	related	observation	—	though	one	 I	do	not	 take	 to	be	as	 impor-
tant	—	is	that	we	criticize	or	praise	others’	emotional	responses.	Meur-
sault,	 for	 example,	 fails	 to	 properly	 respond	 to	 his	 loss,	 and	 others	
disapprove	of	him	for	that.18	However,	I	do	not	think	that	the	felicity	
of	criticism	or	blame	is	the	main	rationale	for	seeing	grief	as	reasons-
responsive.	It	is,	rather,	the	applicability	of	the	why-question,	posed	in	
the	sense	in	which	it	asks	for	reasons	in	light	of	which	we	grieve.
I	hasten	to	add,	however,	that	the	assumption	that	grief	is	respon-
sive	to	reasons	doesn’t	equate	grief	with	judgment.	There	may	well	be	
deep	differences	between	the	two.19	One	important	difference	is	that	
whereas	both	 judgment	and	grief	can	be	recalcitrant	 to	reasons,	 the	
17.	 The	applicability	of	the	Anscombean	why-question	also	leads	me	to	resist	the	
view	of	emotions	as	perceptions	(Prinz	2004):	The	question	of	why	we	grieve	
is	quite	unlike	the	question	of	why	we	perceive:	the	former	asks	for	the	rea-
sons	in	light	of	which	we	grieve,	whereas	the	latter,	insofar	as	it	is	intelligible,	
asks	for	the	point	of,	say,	looking	at	something.	
18.	 Solomon	argues,	in	light	of	Meursault’s	example,	that	there	is	an	obligation	to	
grieve.	He	writes,	“We	are	not	just	surprised	when	a	person	shows	no	signs	
of	grief	after	a	very	personal	loss.	We	are	morally	outraged	and	think	much	
less	of	 the	person”	(2007,	75).	 In	contrast,	Wilkinson	(2000,	296–7)	argues	
that	we	do	not	see	a	failure	to	grieve	as	a	rational	failure	and,	in	light	of	this,	
concludes	that	grief	is	a	non-rational	response.	I	find	Wilkinson’s	argument	
unconvincing,	but	 I	 think	that	only	consideration	of	 the	Anscombean	why-
question	makes	this	clear.	
19.	 Maguire	 (forthcoming)	 argues	 that	 there	 are	 no	 reasons	 for	 emotions	 but	
that	emotions	are	assessed	for	fittingness.	However,	I	don’t	see	talk	of	fitting-
ness	as	an	alternative	to	talk	of	reasons.	Rather,	it	seems	to	me	that	consider-
ations	of	fittingness	could	be	understood	as	a	particular	kind	of	reasons.	Thus	
D’Arms	and	Jacobson	write,	“Crudely	put,	considerations	of	fittingness	are	all	
and	only	those	considerations	about	whether	to	feel	shame,	amusement,	fear,	
and	 so	 forth	 that	 bear	 on	whether	 the	 emotion’s	 evaluation	of	 the	 circum-
stances	gets	it	right:	whether	the	situation	really	is	shameful,	funny,	fearsome,	
and	so	forth”	(2003,	132).
invoking	the	wrong	kind	of	reasons.	Both	explanations	would	speak	to	
the	first-person	perspective	of	the	(former)	griever.	In	this	way,	a	solu-
tion	to	the	puzzle	would	explain	why	reasons	for	grief	expire.14
2. Reasons-Responsiveness
A	fundamental	assumption	of	my	puzzle	 is	 that	grief	 is,	 in	principle,	
responsive	to	reasons.	In	this	section	I	will	clarify	this	assumption	and	
defend	its	plausibility.
	The	assumption	 seems	plausible,	because	our	 emotions	 are	not	
conditions	 that	 befall	 us,	 but	 they	partly	 constitute	 our	 take	on	 the	
world:	In	fear,	we	apprehend	something	as	dangerous,	in	anger	we	ap-
prehend	something	as	a	wrong,	and	in	grief,	we	apprehend	something	
as	a	loss.15	That	is	why	grief	makes	sense	to	us	in light of	something	that	
happens	 in	the	world	—	unlike,	 for	 instance,	a	 fever,	which	we	don’t	
experience	 in light of something,	despite	 the	 fact	 that,	quite	 like	 the	
pangs	of	grief,	it	comes	and	goes.	The	apprehension	involved	in	grief	
is	 reflected	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is,	 in	 principle,	 something	 I	 could	
discover	which	would	extinguish	my	grief:	In	discovering	that	I	hadn’t	
suffered	a	loss	—	that	my	mother	wasn’t	dead	after	all	—	I	would	therein 
stop	grieving.	In	this	respect,	grief	differs	from	a	fever:	there	is	noth-
ing	I	could	discover,	such	that	in	discovering	it,	I	would	cease	to	have	
a	fever.	This	is	captured	in	the	observation	that	when	we	experience	
grief,	the	question	of	why	we	experience	it,	posed	in	the	specific	sense	
in	which	it	asks	for	our	reasons,	finds	application.	(I	think	of	this	as	a	
variation	of	Anscombe’s	why-question.)16	In	contrast,	a	condition	like	
14. An	anonymous	reviewer	suggests	“that	 there	 is	more	to	rationality	 than	re-
sponding	to	(apparent)	reasons,”	for	instance	in	considerations	of	instrumen-
tal	rationality,	rational	coherence,	and	structural	rationality.	My	main	reserva-
tion	is	that	 it	 is	not	clear	to	me	to	what	extent	such	accounts	of	rationality	
speak	to	the	agent’s	understanding,	though	I	do	not	have	space	here	to	ad-
dress	the	issue	adequately.
15.	 See	Solomon	(1976;	2007),	de	Sousa	(1987),	Roberts	(1988),	D’Arms	and	Ja-
cobson	 (2000;	 2003)	 and	Nussbaum	 (2001)	 for	 endorsements	of	 the	view	
that	emotions	are	reasons-responsive,	though	on	different	grounds.
16.	 Anscombe	(1957/2000).	
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these	cases	is	that	there	is	 logical	room	for	such	a	ques-
tion,	about	regret	as	much	as	about	belief,	and	that	the	ac-
tual	fear	or	regret	one	feels	is	answerable	to	such	consid-
erations.	I	may	confess	that	my	fear	is	beyond	my	control	
and	that	I	can’t	help	being	afraid	of	something	where,	by	
my	own	lights,	there	is	nothing	to	be	feared.	But	so	long	
as	 I	am	to	understand	my	condition	as	 fear	of	any	kind,	
even	irrational	fear,	I	cannot	fail	to	accept	the	relevance,	
the	force	of	the	deliberative	question	“Is	there	anything	to	
be	feared	here?”	(2001,	63)
To	apply	Moran’s	thought	to	the	case	of	grief,	I	want	to	say:	as	long	as	I	
am	to	understand	my	condition	as	grief,	even	irrational	grief,	I	cannot	
fail	to	accept	the	relevance	or	applicability	of	the	question,	“What	has	
been	lost?”	
How,	 then,	 are	 we	 to	 understand	 the	 reasons-responsiveness	 of	
grief?	This	is	something	that	I	would	like	to	leave	open,	because	I	do	
not	think	that	the	puzzle	I	described	depends	on	the	particulars	of	an	
account	of	the	reasons-responsiveness	of	emotions.	The	puzzle	arises	
on	 an	 account,	 according	 to	which	 emotions	 partly	 consist	 in	 judg-
ments,	but	it	also	arises	on	an	account,	according	to	which	emotions	
don’t	consist	in,	or	involve	judgments,	but	the	reasons-responsiveness	
of	emotions	is	simply	to	be	understood	in	terms	of	whether	the	emo-
tion	is	a	fitting	appraisal	of	a	situation.	On	such	a	view,	the	question	
is	simply:	Why	is	less	grief	fitting	after	a	certain	amount	of	time	has	
passed?	I	also	want	to	leave	open	whether	reasons-responsiveness	is	
to	be	understood	in	terms	of	obligation	or	permissiveness,	since	I	don’t	
think	of	these	notions	as	the	primary	guide	to	reasons-responsiveness.	
It	may	be	that	grief	is	always	at	most	permissible	and	never	required	
(though	I	did	not	think	of	my	own	grief	that	way).	What	matters	is	that	
even	on	a	permissivist	view,	the	reasons-responsiveness	of	grief	has	a	
temporal	profile.	Even	if	grief	is	always	permissible,	it	seems	plausible	
that	one	has	reason	to	feel	grief	more	strongly	right	after	a	loss	and	
recalcitrance	of	grief	strikes	us	as	less	problematic.20	Richard	Wollheim	
puts	it	well:
Perhaps,	if	we	are	to	think	of	some	emotion	of	ours	as	al-
together	rational,	we	must	think	of	its	object	as	deserving	
it.	But	that	is	neither	the	norm	that	our	emotions	follow,	
nor	 one	 to	which	we	 think	 they	 should	 comply.	 In	 our	
emotional	 life,	we	do	not	always	 feel	ourselves	 to	have	
right	on	our	side.	(1999,	115)
I	think	that	Wollheim	is	correct	that	in	our	emotional	life,	we	do	not	
always	feel	ourselves	to	have	right	on	our	side.	We	might	experience	
sadness	and	think	that	we	have	no	reason	to	be	sad,	we	might	expe-
rience	fear	and	know	that	there	is	nothing	to	be	feared,	or	we	might	
experience	 envy	 and	 know	 that	 the	 other’s	 achievement	would	 not	
really	be	of	value	to	us.	Even	more	often	we	might	experience	an	emo-
tion	very	intensely	—	strong	emotional	responses	to	sports	and	games	
come	to	mind	—	and	take	ourselves	to	be	wrong	in	so	doing.	But	that	
we	do	not	always	feel	right	does	not	suggest	that	we	do	not	aspire,	in	
our	emotional	lives,	to	get	things	right.21	In	experiencing	an	emotion,	
we	 take	 ourselves	 answerable	 for	 experiencing	 it,	 even	 if	 we	 don’t	
think	that	we	have	a	good	answer.	Richard	Moran	sums	up	the	crucial	
point	well:
This	is	not	to	say	that	one	normally	arrives	at	one’s	beliefs	
(let	 alone	 one’s	 fears	 or	 regrets)	 through	 some	 explicit	
process	 of	 deliberation.	 Rather,	 what	 is	 essential	 in	 all	
20.	For	discussion	of	emotional	recalcitrance	to	reasons,	see	Rorty	(1978),	Greens-
pan	(1981;	1988),	Deigh	(1994),	Nussbaum	(2001,	35–6)	and	D’Arms	and	Ja-
cobson	(2003).	
21.	 Wollheim	(1999)	argues	that	our	emotions	provide	us	with	an	attitude	to	the	
world,	in	contrast	to	beliefs,	which	give	us	a	picture	of	the	world.	But	it	seems	
to	me	 that	an	attitude	 is	 reasons-responsive:	 the	question	why	 to	have	an	
attitude	clearly	finds	application.	Thus	I	think	that	Wollheim’s	picture	could	
allow	that	emotions	are	reasons-responsive,	though	perhaps	not	in	the	same	
way	 as	 beliefs.	 For	 a	 similar	 view	 to	Wollheim’s,	which	 nonetheless	 takes	
emotions	to	be	reasons-responsive,	see	de	Sousa	(1987,	esp.	ch.7).
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than	our	spatial	distance	does.	Just	as	whether	something	is	a	loss	or	a	
harm	does	not	depend	on	where	it	occurs,	it	does	not	depend	on	when 
it	occurs.	To	echo	Simone	Weil:	What’s	time	got	to	do	with	it?	“Comme	
si	le	temps	faisait	quelque	chose	à	l’affaire”?25 
On	 this	hardline	view,	 temporal	distance	matters	only	 insofar	 as	
it	affords	a	psychological	explanation	of	our	disinclination	to	grieve	
losses	that	have	receded	into	the	past.	Temporal	distance	is	like	spatial	
distance	from	those	in	need	as	Singer	sees	it:	It	explains	our	reactions	
but	does	not	justify	them.	
I	think	that	there	is	something	attractive	about	the	hardline	view:	
It	is	neat	and	clear	and	uncompromising.	But	I	do	not	think	that	it	can	
be	right.	Temporal	distance	does	not	merely	make	us	grieve	 less;	 in	
many	cases	it	seems	that	we	are	not	wrong	to	grieve	less.	Indeed,	there	
is	something	wrong	with	being	stuck;	there	is	something	wrong	with	
persistent	grief.	Persistent	grief	 is	distinguishable	 from	(statistically)	
normal	grief	—	and,	interestingly,	the	main	criterion	is	duration.	DSM-
5	states:
Persistent	 complex	 bereavement	 disorder	 is	 diagnosed	
only	 if	 at	 least	 12	months	 (6	months	 in	 children)	 have	
elapsed	since	 the	death	of	someone	with	whom	the	be-
reaved	had	a	 close	 relationship.	…	This	 time	 frame	dis-
criminates	normal	grief	from	persistent	grief.	(American	
Psychological	Association,	2013)
Persistent	 grief	 is	 a	mental	 disorder	 of	 sorts,	 though	DSM-5	 lists	 it	
25.	Maurice	Schumann	recalls	Simone	Weil	saying:	“How	can	we	condemn	the	
holocausts	which	are	 in	preparation	or	 are	being	perpetrated	around	us	 if	
we	don’t	condemn,	or	even	 if	acknowledge	the	holocausts	as	 truths	of	 the	
faith	[i.e.	the	killings	described	in	the	Hebrew	Bible]	under	the	pretext	that	
they	occurred	thousands	of	years	ago,	as if time made a difference to the matter?”	
(Kahn,	ed.	1978,	25,	translation	and	italics	mine).	(“Comment	pouvons-nous	
condamner	 les	holocausts	qui	se	préparent	ou	qui	se	perpètrent	autour	de	
nous	si	nous	ne	condamnons	pas,	ou	même	si	nous	reconnaissons	comme	
vérités	de	la	foi	 les	holocauses	sous	prétexte	qu’ils	se	sont	écoulés	 il	y	a	un	
certain	nombre	de	millénaires,	 comme	 si	 le	 temps	 faisait	 quelque	 chose	 à	
l’affaire?”).	I	owe	the	reference	to	Yourgrau	(2010,	127).	See	Yourgrau	(2010)	
for	an	account	of	Weil’s	own	suffering	over	temporally	distant	harms.
less	 strongly	 as	 time	passes.22	Understanding	 rationality	 in	 terms	of	
permissiveness	may	make	the	puzzle	less	pronounced,	but	it	will	not	
address	it,	as	long	as	the	temporal	profile	of	the	reasons	for	grief	is	not	
properly	understood.
3. The Hardline View: Reasons Don’t Expire
A	first	response	to	my	puzzle	insists	that	reasons	don’t	expire.23	The	
main	rationale	for	it	is	the	plausible	observation	that	a	loss	does	not	
cease	to	be	a	loss	as	it	recedes	into	the	past.	The	death	of	my	mother	
was	a	loss	when	it	occurred	and	remains	a	loss	to	this	day,	even	as	I	
move	on	in	life.	It	is	not	undone	by	the	passage	of	time,	and	it	is	not	
undone	by	the	many	events	in	my	life	that	have	occurred	since	then,	
such	as	the	birth	of	my	children.	But	since	this	loss	is	a	reason	for	grief,	
and	since	it	remains	a	loss,	it	remains	a	reason	for	grief.24
Indeed,	we	can	think	of	this	hardline	view	as	the	temporal	counter-
part	to	Peter	Singer’s	view	in	“Famine,	Affluence,	and	Morality”	(1972)	
that	spatial	distance	does	not	affect	our	intrinsic	reasons	to	aid	those	
in	need.	Presumably,	Singer’s	view	applies	to	time	as	well	as	to	space.	
Our	temporal	distance	to	others	may	limit	the	ways	we	can	aid	them,	
since	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	send	aid	to	 the	past,	but	our	 temporal	dis-
tance	 as	 such	does	not	 seem	 to	 affect	 the	 intrinsic	moral	 facts,	 and	
therefore	 the	 reasons	 that	others’	plight	presents	us	with,	any	more	
22.	 Sometimes	one	may	have	reason	to	pre-grieve	a	loss	—	though	the	strength	
of	reasons	for	pre-grief	seems	to	me	to	depend	on	the	imminence	of	the	loss	
and,	therefore,	to	exhibit	a	temporal	profile	as	well.
23.	 Agnes	Callard	has	defended	a	view	in	this	vein	in	several	talks,	though	she	
has	ultimately	come	to	reject	it	(Callard,	2018).	
24.	 This	may	 seem	especially	plausible	 if	 there	 is	 a	 close	 connection	between	
values	—	such	as	losses	—	and	reasons:	For	instance,	on	a	“buck-passing”	view	
like	T.M.	Scanlon’s,	for	something	to	be	a	value	is	for	it	to	have	a	particular	
second-order	property	—	namely	the	property	of	having	properties	in	virtue	
of	which	we	have	reasons	 for	certain	attitudes	and	actions	(1998,	97).	And	
it	seems	plausible	to	hold	that	something’s	being	a	loss	consists	in	having	a	
property	that	provides	us	with	reasons	—	such	as	a	reason	to	grieve.	On	Scan-
lon’s	view,	we	can	use	the	notion	of	reasons	to	explain	values.	But	for	present	
purposes	—	when	we	are	 trying	 to	settle	what	 reasons	we	have	—	we	could	
see	the	explanation	as	going	the	other	way	around,	from	values	to	reasons.
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through	fire	for	their	husbands	and	wives,	and	generally	
show	tremendous	concern	before	their	loss.	It	is	just	that	
afterwards	 adaptive	mechanisms	 operate	 so	 as	 immedi-
ately	to	extinguish	any	feelings	of	distress.	(313)
The	Sub-resilient	are	like	us	except	that	they	never	cease	
caring	 as	deeply	 for	 their	 spouses	 as	 at	 the	moment	of	
death;	the	loss	of	that	relationship	is	as	deeply	felt	at	half	
a	 century	 as	 it	 is	 at	 half	 an	 hour.	 The	 bereaved	 Sub-re-
silient	are	consequently	extremely	unhappy	people	who	
feel	they	suffer	from	a	kind	of	never-healing	open	wound.	
(314)
It	 seems	 to	me	 that	 the	 Sub-resilient	 are	 not	 the	more	 rational	 spe-
cies,	 as	 the	 hardline	 view	would	 imply.	 Indeed,	 I	 think	Moller’s	 ex-
ample	makes	vivid	that	to	assess	the	reasons-responsiveness	of	grief,	
we	need	a	realistic	moral	psychology	—	a	moral	psychology	for	human	
beings.	We	cannot	settle	to	what	extent	the	Super-resilient	or	the	Sub-
resilient	alien	experiences	of	loss	are	reasons-responsive.	Their	expe-
rience	of	grief,	if	we	may	call	it	that,	is	fundamentally	different	from	
ours.	We,	human	beings,	grieve	for	a	limited	time.	If	we	grieve	too	little,	
we	are	unresponsive	to	our	reasons	because	we	are	insensitive.	If	we	
grieve	too	much,	we	are	unresponsive	to	our	reasons	because	we	are	
stuck.	For	us,	reasons-responsive	grief	takes	time,	but	not	too	much.
To	say	that	we	need	a	realistic	moral	psychology,	however,	is	not	
yet	to	solve	my	puzzle.	We	still	need	to	make	sense	of	the	anticipation	
of,	and	retrospection	on,	the	diminution	of	grief.	For	instance,	when	I	
grieve	for	my	mother,	I	may	know	that	my	grief	will	diminish	with	time.	
I	may	know	that,	realistically,	this	is	how	things	are	for	a	human	being	
like	me.	But	that	alone	does	not	help	me	answer	the	why-question	in	
light	of	which	the	diminution	of	grief	would	make	sense.	It	does	not	
help	answer	the	Proustian	worry	that,	with	time,	I	will	stop	caring	for	
among	“Conditions	for	Further	Study.”	In	contrast,	normal	grief	is	not	a	
mental	disorder.	But	if	the	hardline	view	were	correct,	persistent	grief	
would	not	be	a	mental	disorder	but	the	rational	response	to	a	loss.26
The	conclusion	I	propose	to	draw	from	this	observation	is	that	the	
hardline	view	offers	us	an	unrealistic	moral	psychology.	The	hardline	
view	does	not	adequately	take	into	account	the	psychological	reality	
of	human	grief;	it	does	not	adequately	take	into	account	how	grief	is	
actually	experienced.27	Bernard	Williams	makes	a	point	in	this	vein	in	
a	side	remark	in	his	famous	“Moral	Luck.”	 In	arguing	that	the	justifi-
cation	of	moral	approval	depends	on	one’s	perspective,	Bernard	Wil-
liams	remarks,	“This	 is	 just	one	of	 the	ways	—	the distancing of time is 
another	—	in	which,	if	the	moral	sentiments	are	to	be	part	of	life	as	it	is	
actually	experienced,	they	cannot	be	modelled	on	a	view	of	the	world	
in	which	every	happening	and	every	person	is	at	the	same	distance”	
(1981,	37,	italics	mine).	Williams’s	thought	is	something	like	this:	If	we	
are	 to	understand	the	 justification	of	an	emotion,	we	must	consider	
the	emotion	as	it	is	actually	experienced.	And	since	in	experiencing	an	
emotion	like	grief,	the	temporal	distance	from	a	loss	matters,	whether	
the	emotion	is	justified	depends	on	its	temporal	relation	to	the	loss.
I	can	illustrate	my	objection	to	the	hardline	view	through	a	discus-
sion	 in	Dan	Moller’s	paper,	 “Love	and	Death”	 (2007,	 313–5).	Moller	
asks	us	to	consider	two	kinds	of	alien	species	—	the	Super-resilient	and	
the	Sub-resilient:
[The	 Super-resilient]	 are	 like	 us	 except	 that	 members	
have	no	grief	reactions	at	all	to	what	would	strike	us	as	
great	tragedies….	When	their	spouses	drop	dead	in	front	
of	them,	they	shrug	their	shoulders	and	check	what	is	on	
television.	They	…	deny	not	caring	for	their	loved	ones;	
in	fact,	investigation	reveals	that	they	are	willing	to	walk	
26.	Wilkinson	 (2000)	 argues	 that	 normal	 grief	 is	 a	 mental	 disorder	 on	 the	
grounds	that	it	is	not	a	rational	state.	I	hold	that	since	normal	grief	is	rational,	
or,	rather,	reasons-responsive,	it	is	not	a	mental	disorder.
27.	 Compare	 here	Wittgenstein’s	 remarks	 about	 hope,	 deep	 feeling	 and	 grief	
(Wittgenstein	1953/2003,	§583,	pt.	II,	sect.	ix).
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time.	Other	things	being	equal,	it	is	not	fitting	to	feel	the	
same	 intense	 emotion	 towards	 past	 sufferings	 that	 oc-
curred	 thousands	of	years	back	 in	 the	past	as	we	do	 to-
wards	some	current	suffering	of	the	same	severity.
In	all	 these	cases,	 the	degree	 to	which	 it	 is	fitting	 to	
positively	 respond	 to	 a	 state	 of	 affairs	 does	 not	 corre-
spond	to	the	degree	to	which	it	is	good.	How	strongly	one	
should	favour	an	objectively	valuable	object	depends	on	
the	 ‘distance’	between	oneself	 and	 the	object.	…	 [T]his	
distance	has	many	dimensions,	including	modal	distance,	
temporal	distance,	and	‘personal’	distance.	It	is,	therefore,	
all	 too	crude	 to	say	 that	 it	 is	always	fitting	 to	 feel	more	
strongly	about	a	better	state	of	affairs	or	 to	be	emotion-
ally	indifferent	between	states	of	affairs	of	the	same	value.	
(2009,	16)29
Bykvist’s	 aim,	 in	 making	 his	 argument,	 is	 primarily	 critical:	 He	
seeks	to	object	to	views	like	the	hardline	view,	which	see	a	very	close	
relation	between	values	and	our	 reasons.	However,	Bykvist’s	discus-
sion	also	suggests	that	the	griever’s	temporal	distance	to	a	loss	could	
be	understood	as	akin	to	her	“personal”	distance.	Perhaps	we	can	con-
clude	that	just	as	I	have	more	reason	to	grieve	my	mother’s	death	than	
you	have	reason	to	grieve	it,	I	have	more	reason	to	grieve	a	loss	in	the	
present	than	a	loss	in	the	past.	
I	want	 to	 register	a	phenomenological	objection	 to	 this	proposal.	
It	strikes	me	that	thinking,	“It’s	not	my	mother,”	makes	sense	of	why	I	
don’t	grieve	in	a	way	that	saying,	“She	died	long	ago,”	does	not.	Here	
29.	For	 a	 similar	 argument	 about	 blameworthiness,	 see	 Coleman	 and	 Sarch	
(2012).	 Like	Bykvist,	Coleman	 and	 Sarch	observe	 that	 it	 is	 appropriate	 for	
blaming	and	 related	 reactive	attitudes	 to	diminish	over	 time,	 even	 though	
the	blameworthiness	of	an	act	does	not	diminish,	and	they	argue	that	this	is	a	
problem	for	“buck-passing”	theories	of	blameworthiness.	I	think	that	they	fail	
to	see	that	this	poses	a	deeper	problem	for	our	understanding	of	the	tempo-
rality	of	blame,	a	problem	that	goes	well	beyond	the	buck-passing	theories.	I	
discuss	this	in	Marušić	(in	preparation).	
my	mother	or	that	she	will	no	longer	matter	to	me.	Why	would	I	stop	
grieving	if	I	continue	to	love?28
I	conclude	that	the	hardline	view	should	be	rejected	on	the	grounds	
that	it	presupposes	an	unrealistic	moral	psychology	of	grief.	Our	expe-
rience	of	grief	is	conditioned	by	our	psychology,	our	physiology,	our	
history	 and	our	 social	 circumstances.	And	all	 this	 somehow	also	 af-
fects	our	reasons	for	grief:	the	reasons-responsiveness	of	grief	seems	
to	be	constrained	by	the	psychological	reality	of	grief.	But	it	is	a	philo-
sophical	project	to	explain	exactly	how	this	could	be	so.
4. Temporality as Partiality
A	first	attempt	 to	provide	such	an	explanation	 is	 to	 take	a	cue	 from	
Williams’s	claim	that	“the	moral	sentiments	…	cannot	be	modelled	on	
a	view	of	the	world	in	which	every	happening	and	every	person	is	at	
the	same	distance”	(1981,	37).	The	place	and	time	of	the	griever,	as	well	
as	other	features	of	her,	seem	to	play	a	crucial	role	in	determining	her	
reasons	 for	grief.	 For	 instance,	 I	 grieved	 intensely	when	my	mother	
died,	but	the	deaths	of	many	mothers	leave	me	cold.	And	that	is	how	
it	should	be:	the	fact	that	it	was	my	mother	who	died,	and	that	I	love	
her,	is	partly	what	determines	the	significance	of	my	reason	for	grief.	
In	light	of	this,	we	could	seek	to	understand	the	temporality	of	rea-
sons	for	grief	by	analogy	to	their	partiality:	We	might	think	that	just	
as	the	familial	relation	between	the	griever	and	the	dead	affects	the	
griever’s	reasons,	 the	temporal	relation	between	the	griever	and	the	
dead	affects	the	griever’s	reasons.	Krister	Bykvist	makes	this	argument:	
How	strongly	we	 should	 react	 emotionally	 seems	…	 to	
depend	on	temporal	matters.	For	instance,	we	think	it	is	
fitting	 that	 the	grief	of	a	 lost	beloved	softens	with	 time.	
More	generally,	 it	 seems	fitting	 that	 the	extreme	horror	
we	once	felt	towards	some	terrible	massacre	softens	with	
28.	My	argument	that	the	hardline	view	offers	an	unrealistic	moral	psychology	is	
indebted	to	Lucy	O’Brien	and	Douglas	Lavin’s	discussion	in	“Living	Histori-
cally”	(in	preparation).	Unlike	O’Brien	and	Lavin,	however,	I	don’t	take	the	
articulation	of	a	realistic	moral	psychology	to	solve	(or	dissolve)	the	puzzle.	
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Clive	 and	Deborah	 are	 still	 very	much	 in	 love	with	
each	other,	despite	his	amnesia.	(Indeed,	Deborah’s	book	
is	subtitled	“A	Memoir	of	Love	and	Amnesia.”)	He	greeted	
her	several	times	as	if	she	had	just	arrived.	It	must	be	an	
extraordinary	situation,	 I	 thought,	both	maddening	and	
flattering,	to	be	seen	always	as	new,	as	a	gift,	a	blessing.
Eventually,	Sacks	concludes:
It	has	been	twenty	years	since	Clive’s	illness,	and,	for	him,	
nothing has moved on.	One	might	say	he	is	still	in	1985	or,	
given	his	retrograde	amnesia,	in	1965.	In	some	ways,	he	is	
not	anywhere	at	all;	he	has	dropped	out	of	space	and	time	
altogether.	He	no	longer	has	any	inner	narrative;	he	is	not	
leading	a	life	in	the	sense	that	the	rest	of	us	do.	And	yet	
one	has	only	to	see	him	at	the	keyboard	or	with	Deborah	
to	feel	that,	at	such	times,	he	is	himself	again	and	wholly	
alive.	It	is	not	the	remembrance	of	things	past,	the	“once”	
that	Clive	yearns	for,	or	can	ever	achieve.	It	is	the	claim-
ing,	 the	filling,	of	 the	present,	 the	now,	and	this	 is	only	
possible	when	he	 is	 totally	 immersed	 in	 the	 successive	
moments	of	an	act.	It	is	the	“now”	that	bridges	the	abyss.	
(Sacks	2007,	italics	mine)
Wearing’s	 deeply	 distressing	 case	 illustrates	 why	 temporal	 distance	
and	“personal”	distance	cannot	be	understood	in	the	same	way.	If	we	
have	less	reason	to	grieve	over	time,	it	is	not	because	our	loss	is	at	a	
greater	temporal	distance;	it	is	because	we	have	already	grieved.	Griev-
ing	requires	something	that	Wearing	does	not	have	—	a	persistent	con-
ception	of	 the	past	as	well	as	a	continued	and	continuously	remem-
bered	experience	of	grieving.31
31.	 This	argument	should	make	clear	why	my	puzzle	is	distinct	from	Lucretius’s	
puzzle	about	why	we	fear	death	but	are	unconcerned	about	pre-natal	non-
existence.	Lucretius’s	puzzle	has	to	do	with	the	futurity	of	death	and	depends	
essentially	on	the	nature	of	time.	My	puzzle	is	not	primarily	concerned	with	
Weil	just	seems	to	me	to	get	it	right:	What’s	time	got	to	do	with	it?	Why	
should	the	mere	passage	of	time	make	a	difference	to	my	reasons?
I	think	it	does	not.	To	show	this,	I	offer	the	following	two	examples:30 
First,	suppose	you	are	in	a	car	accident	with	your	mother.	You	survive,	
but	your	mother	does	not.	However,	you	spend	ten	years	in	a	coma.	
When	you	wake	up,	you	are	informed	that	your	mother	has	died.	You	
are	not	relieved,	and	have	no	reason	to	be	relieved,	to	hear	that	the	
accident	happened	ten	years	ago.	The	mere	passage	of	time	makes	no	
difference	to	your	reasons.	In	contrast,	if	you	learn	that	it	was	not	your	
mother	who	died,	you	will	be	relieved	and,	plausibly,	you	have	reason	
to	be	relieved.
As	a	second	example,	consider	Oliver	Sacks’s	harrowing	case	his-
tory	of	Clive	Wearing,	an	English	musician	and	musicologist,	who	suf-
fers	from,	as	Sacks	puts	it,	“the	most	devastating	case	of	amnesia	ever	
recorded”	 (2007).	This	 amnesia	prevents	Wearing	 from	engaging	 in	
temporally	extended	activities	 like	grief.	Sacks	describes	a	conversa-
tion	with	Deborah	Wearing,	Clive	Wearing’s	wife,	who	had	written	a	
memoir:
When	 I	 asked	Deborah	whether	 Clive	 knew	 about	 her	
memoir,	she	told	me	that	she	had	shown	it	to	him	twice	
before,	but	that	he	had	instantly	forgotten.	I	had	my	own	
heavily	annotated	copy	with	me,	and	asked	Deborah	to	
show	it	to	him	again.
“You’ve	 written	 a	 book!”	 he	 cried,	 astonished.	 “Well	
done!	Congratulations!”	He	peered	at	 the	 cover.	 “All	by	
you?	Good	heavens!”	Excited,	he	jumped	for	joy.	Deborah	
showed	him	the	dedication	page:	“For	my	Clive.”	“Dedi-
cated	 to	me?”	He	hugged	her.	 This	 scene	was	 repeated	
several	 times	within	a	few	minutes,	with	almost	exactly	
the	same	astonishment,	the	same	expressions	of	delight	
and	joy	each	time.
30.	Thanks	to	Eli	Hirsch	for	the	first	example	and	Jeremy	Fantl	for	pointing	me	to	
the	second.
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process	can	adequately	address	my	puzzle.	To	think	of	grief	as	a	heal-
ing	process	involves	a	distinct	kind	of	alienation:	it	requires	taking	a	
detached,	clinical	view	of	ourselves.35	When	we	view	grief	as	a	healing	
process,	we	turn	our	attention	away	from	our	 loss,	 to	ourselves.	But	
this	distorts	 the	grief.	When	I	grieve,	my	attention	 is	directed	to	my	
loss,	not	myself. When	my	mother	dies,	I	think,	not,	“This	is	hard	for	
me”	but	“No!	She	is	dead.”	In	grief,	I	am	transparent:	I	am	the	pained	
apprehension	of	loss.	But	when	I	take	a	detached	view	of	grief,	and	ap-
prehend	myself	as	suffering	from	a	psychological	injury,	my	attention	
shifts	from	my	loss	to	—	myself.	I	think	about	the	fact	that	I	am	beset	
by	grief.	I	can	then	understand	my	grief	as	an	emotional	response	to	
a	psychological	 injury	 that	 I	have	 to	 live	with.	 I	 can	see	my	grief	as	
posing	a	problem	for	me	—	something	I	need	to	cope	with	or	manage.	
However,	 this	 is	an	alienated	view	—	a	view	in	which	I	no	 longer	at-
tend	to	my	reasons	for	grief	but	to	myself.
The	process	view	cannot	offer	an	adequate	solution	to	my	puzzle,	
because	if,	as	a	griever,	I	think	of	my	grief	as	a	process	that	I	am	un-
dergoing,	I	am	no	longer	attending	to	what	my	grief	is	about.	I	don’t	
attend	to	the	reasons	in	light	of	which	I	grieve,	and	that	is	why	I	do	not	
accurately	comprehend	why	my	grief	should	diminish.	
Here	is	how	the	point	becomes	clearest:	If	the	diminution	of	grief	
consists	in	the	healing	of	a	psychological	injury,	then	the	end	of	grief	is	
something	that	we	should	be	looking	forward	to.	The	thought	that	we	
will	heal	should	strike	us	as	a	relief.	But	this	is	not	how	we	feel	about	
the	diminution	of	grief,	when	we	anticipate	that	the	loss	will	continue	
to	matter	to	us.	We	don’t	look	forward	to	the	end	of	grief	but	shrink	
from	it.	
Well,	 perhaps	 this	 is	 too	 high-minded.	 Perhaps	we	 are	 not	 pure	
Proustians,	and	we	do	look	forward	to	the	end	of	the	pain	of	grief.	Fair	
enough.	However,	when	we	grieve,	we	don’t	merely	feel	pain,	and	we	
don’t	merely,	or	mainly,	look	forward	to	the	end	of	the	pain.	In	grieving,	
we	also	apprehend	our	loss,	and	insofar	as	we	do,	we	understand	our	
35.	 Here	I	follow	what	I	take	to	be	essentially	Moran’s	argument	in	Authority and 
Estrangement	(2001).	
This	suggests	that	a	realistic	moral	psychology	of	grief	and	the	rea-
sons	 for	 it	will	not	see	 the	griever’s	 temporal	distance	to	 the	 loss	as	
a	crucial	feature	but	rather,	the	griever’s	experience	of	grieving	over	
time	—	the	successful	completion	of	the	psychological	process	of	grief.
5. The Process View
In	this	section,	I	want	to	consider	the	possibility	that	reasons	for	grief	
diminish	in	virtue	of	our	having	grieved,	that	is,	in	virtue	of	our	com-
pleting	the	process	of	grief.
It	 is	 plausible	 to	 think	 of	 grief	 as	 a	 process	—	a	 process	 through	
which	we	heal	 from	a	psychological	 injury.32	Alternatively,	we	could	
think	of	grief	not	as	the	healing	process	itself	but	as	a	manifestation	of	
it	—	a	manifestation	of	our	 “emotional	 immune	 system,”	which	 regu-
lates	our	emotional	response	to	loss.33	Alternatively,	and	perhaps	even	
more	plausibly,	we	could	think	of	grief	as	an	experience	of	a	psycho-
logical	injury	concomitant	to	a	healing	process:	as	the	healing	process	
progresses,	we	feel	less	grief	—	just	as	when	we	heal	from	an	injury,	we	
feel	less	pain.	Either	way,	the	duration	of	grief	would	be	determined	by	
the	duration	of	the	healing	process.	This	would	suggest	that	reasons	
expire	when	the	healing	process	is	complete.34
However,	 I	 do	 not	 think	 that	 a	 conception	 of	 grief	 as	 a	 healing	
the	nature	of	time	since	it	is	not	through	the	passage	of	time	alone	that	rea-
sons	for	grief	expire.	
32.	 This	might	seem	especially	plausible	if	it	is	held	that	grief	has	stages	—	for	in-
stance	the	five	stages	posited	by	Elisabeth	Kübler-Ross	(1969):	denial,	anger,	
bargaining,	depression	and	acceptance.	However,	see	Bonanno	(2009,	20–1)	
for	criticism.
33.	 See	Gilbert	 et al.	 (1998)	 for	 an	 account	of	 the	 “emotional	 immune	 system,”	
which	 regulates	our	 response	 to	 loss.	 I	 owe	 the	 reference	 to	Moller	 (2007,	
305).
34.	 For	a	more	sophisticated	view	of	grief	as	a	process	—	a	narrative	process	—	see	
Goldie	(2012,	ch.	3).	Here	I	do	not	have	space	to	address	the	details	of	Gold-
ie’s	thoughtful	account.	However,	the	objection	I	raise	in	what	follows	—	that	
the	process	view	is	alienated	—	also	applies	to	Goldie’s	view.	The	objection	
that	a	narrative	perspective	involves	alienation	goes	back	at	least	to	Sartre’s	
Nausea	(1938/2007)	and	is	thoughtfully	discussed	in	Moran	(2015).
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understanding	in	a	way	that	a	healing	process	does	not.	Perhaps	if	we	
could	describe	the	process	as	itself	involving	understanding,	we	could	
eliminate	 the	double	 vision.	 The	 crucial	 thought	would	be	 that	 the	
process	of	grief	is	an	intelligent	process.	Perhaps	the	process	of	grief	is	
psychological	work?
6. Grief as Work
In	this	section,	I	will	consider	whether	understanding	grief	as	psycho-
logical	work	could	explain	why	reasons	for	grief	expire.	 Importantly,	
the	view	that	grief	is	psychological	work	is	concerned	with	the	emo-
tion	of	grief,	not	activities	that	constitute	the	activity	grieving	(such	as	
sitting	Shiva).	According	to	the	work	view,	the	emotional	response	to	
loss	 is	 itself	best	understood	as	a	 form	of	work	—	a	coming	to	terms	
with	loss.
Here	are	two	prominent	formulations	of	something	like	the	work	
view.	In	“Mourning	and	Melancholia,”	Freud	understands	grief	as	the	
activity	of	“reality-testing”	through	which	one’s	 libido	detaches	itself	
from	the	“lost	object.”	He	writes,	“In	mourning	time	is	needed	for	the	
command	of	reality-testing	to	be	carried	out	in	detail,	and	…	when	this	
work	has	been	accomplished	the	ego	will	have	succeeded	in	freeing	
its	libido	from	the	lost	object”	(252).	“[W]hen	the	work	of	mourning	is	
completed	the	ego	becomes	free	and	uninhibited	again”	(245).36
36.	Freud	 repeatedly	 stresses	 that	 he	 doesn’t	 know	 the	 “economic	means”	 by	
which	this	work	is	carried	out	(245;	255).	He	offers	merely	a	conjecture:	“Each	
single	one	of	the	memories	and	situations	of	expectancy	which	demonstrate	
the	libido’s	attachment	to	the	lost	object	is	met	by	the	verdict	of	reality	that	
the	object	no	longer	exists;	and	the	ego,	confronted	as	it	were	with	the	ques-
tion	whether	it	shall	share	this	fate,	is	persuaded	by	the	sum	of	the	narcissistic	
satisfactions	it	derives	from	being	alive	to	sever	its	attachment	to	the	object	
that	has	been	abolished.	We	may	perhaps	suppose	 that	 this	work	of	sever-
ance	is	…	slow	and	gradual”	(255).	Bonanno	rejects	the	conception	of	grief	as	
work,	because	he	objects	to	Freud’s	account	of	grief	on	the	grounds	that	going	
through	the	memories	of	the	dead	would	perpetuate	grief,	since	it	would	lead	
those	memories	to	dominate	our	consciousness	(2009,	17–8).	However,	I	see	
this	as	an	objection	to	the	particulars	of	Freud’s	account	of	grief	as	work,	not	
to	the	general	idea	that	grief	consists	in	psychological	work.
grief	as	response	to	a	reason.	In	this	respect,	grief	differs	from	a	physi-
ological	injury:	unlike	an	injury,	grief	involves	understanding.	But	the	
process	view,	at	least	as	considered	so	far,	does	not	speak	to	what	we	
understand	 in	grieving.	As	 far	 as	 the	process	view	 is	 concerned,	 all	
that	matters	is	that	we	heal;	it	does	not	matter	whether	we	are	healing	
from	(as	it	were)	a	rational	psychological	injury,	nor	whether	the	psy-
chological	injury	(as	it	were)	continues	to	be	rational.	Indeed,	this	very	
formulation	brings	the	distortion	to	light:	It	makes	no	sense	to	speak	
of	injuries	as	rational	or	irrational	—	and	so,	on	the	process	view,	the	
reasons-responsiveness	of	grief	falls	out	of	the	picture.
This	is	not	to	deny	that	the	process	view	contains	an	insight:	When	
we	suffer	a	loss,	we	do	undergo	a	healing	process.	And	it	is	plausible	
that	the	duration	of	grief	is	reflected	in	the	completion	of	this	process.	
Someone	who	 is	 interested	 in	our	well-being	—	a	doctor,	 say,	or	 the	
HR	department	 in	our	 company,	or	 a	bookie	—	will	be	 interested	 in	
how	 the	healing	process	 is	 coming	 along:	how	much	we	 are	 suffer-
ing,	whether	we	 can	get	back	 to	work,	whether	we	will	 need	 to	 in-
voke	FMLA,	and	so	on.	And,	as	grievers,	we	will	be	interested	in	these	
things,	too.	However,	for	us,	this	is	not	the	whole	story:	for	us,	our	grief	
is	 a	 response	 to	 a	 loss,	 and	 the	 reasons	 that	determine	 the	 reasons-
responsiveness	of	grief	don’t	 seem	 to	have	anything	 to	do	with	 the	
healing	process.	That	is	why,	to	the	extent	that	we	view	ourselves	as	
undergoing	a	process,	we	become	alienated	from	our	grief.	This	shows	
that	 the	process	view	does	not	provide	an	adequate	 solution	 to	my	
puzzle:	it	does	not	adequately	address	how	to	anticipate	the	diminu-
tion	of	grief,	nor	does	it	help	us	understand,	in	retrospect,	in	light	of	
which	reasons	our	grief	diminished.	
The	process	view	leaves	us,	as	it	were,	in	a	state	of	double-vision:	
As	grievers,	we	at	once	apprehend	our	 loss	but	also	apprehend	that	
we	are	undergoing	a	healing	process.	However,	we	can’t	hold	both	ap-
prehensions	together	in	one	consciousness:	we	can’t	reconcile	these	
two	perspectives.
One	 might	 think	 that	 this	 is	 so	 because	 we	 have	 worked	 with	
too	 crude	 a	 conception	 of	 the	 process.	 After	 all,	 grief	 involves	
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Although	 there	 is	 some	plausibility	 in	 the	 thought	 that	grief	 con-
sists	 in	psychological	work,	ultimately	I	 think	that	this	 is	a	distorted	
view.	In	the	end	we	will	be	left	with	the	same	kind	of	double	vision	as	
on	the	simpler	process	view.	Here	is	why.
We	think	of	work	as	a	goal-directed	activity	that	aims	at	change.	But	
we	do	not	think	of	grief	as	aimed	at	change.	More	precisely,	in	grieving,	
we	do	not	think	of	our	grief	as	aimed	at	change	—	at	the	detachment	
from	the	lost	object.
Let	me	 illustrate:	When	we	work	 in	 the	garden	with	 the	goal	of	
clearing	weeds	from	the	flower	beds,	we	continue	(if	all	goes	well)	un-
til	the	weeds	are	cleared,	and	then	we	stop.	Perhaps	we	subsequently	
adopt	a	new	goal,	or	we	change	our	focus	altogether.	But	as	we	work,	
the	 thought	 that	we	will	work	until	 all	weeds	 are	 cleared	 is	 not,	 in	
principle,	disconcerting	—	though	we	might	feel	overwhelmed	at	the	
sight	of	an	overgrown	garden.	There	is	nothing	problematic	as	such	
about	 the	 thought	 that	our	work	will	come	to	an	end	once	our	 task	
is	complete.	And	if	grief	consists	in	psychological	work,	then	matters	
should	be	the	same	with	grief.
But	they	are	not	—	as	the	Proustian	observation	makes	vivid.	When	
we	pull	out	weeds	from	the	garden,	then	we	(quite	literally!)	remove	
the	reasons	we	have	to	be	working	—	the	weeds	that	grow	in	the	gar-
den.	However,	when	we	grieve,	we	don’t	 therein	produce	a	change;	
we	don’t	remove	our	reasons	to	grieve.	Indeed,	in	grieving,	“there	is	
nothing	which	can	be	done”	(Gustafson	1989,	469).39
Of	course,	there	is	much	that	we	can	do	when	we	grieve.	We	can	
pay	 respect	 to	 the	dead,	we	 can	acknowledge	our	 loss,	 and	we	 can	
manage our	grief.	Much	of	 this	 is	done	through	various	activities	of	
grieving	—	such	 as	 sitting	 Shiva	—	and	 various	 ways	 of	 coping.	 But	
“bewältigen”	signifies	something	one	would	do	with	a	task.	Man bewältigt eine 
Aufgabe.
39.	Gustafson	 writes,	 “the	 peculiar	 strength	 and	 depth	 of	 the	 feeling	 of	 grief	
might	well	be	explained	by	the	absence	of	any	rational	motive	force	and	the	
absence	of	associated	action”	(469).	I	am	indebted	to	Arden	Koehler	for	the	
formulations	in	this	paragraph.
In	a	similar	vein,	though	without	the	Freudian	theoretical	commit-
ments,	Nussbaum	argues,
[T]he	experience	of	mourning	is	in	great	part	an	experi-
ence	of	repeatedly	encountering	cognitive	frustration	and	
reweaving	 one’s	 cognitive	 fabric	 in	 consequence.	 I	 find	
myself	about	to	pick	up	the	telephone	to	tell	[my	mother]	
what	 has	 just	 happened	—	and	 then	 see	before	me	 that	
image	 of	 her	 lying	 in	 the	 hospital	 bed,	 with	 the	 tube	
coming	out	of	her	nose.	In	every	area	of	my	life	in	which	
she	has	played	a	part,	 I	find	myself	expecting	her	to	ap-
pear	—	and	I then must work to	cut	short	and	to	rearrange	
these	expectations.	(2001,	80–1,	italics	mine)
We	can	set	aside	the	particulars	of	Freud’s	and	Nussbaum’s	views	for	
present	purposes.	We	can	simply	take	it	that	what	matters	is	that	griev-
ing	is	an	active	process,	which	takes	time	and	during	which	we	accom-
plish	something:	we	accomplish	the	detachment	from	the	person	or	
object	we	have	lost.37
A	virtue	of	the	conception	of	grief	as	work	is	that	it	takes	seriously	
the	observation	that	grief	is	a	process	that	takes	time.	It	implies	that,	
if	reasons	expire,	it	is	not	in	virtue	of	the	passage	of	time	alone	but	in	
virtue	of	the	activity	of	grieving,	which	takes	time.	However,	in	light	
of	this	very	point,	one	might	wonder	whether	I	have	made	a	mistake	
in	framing	the	puzzle.	Perhaps	we	should	ask,	not	“Do	reasons	expire?”	
but	rather,	“Do	we	exhaust	our	reasons”?38
37.	 In	her	recent	Anger and Forgiveness,	Nussbaum	presents	a	less	active	view	of	
grief:	“[W]orking	through	grief	is	something	that	simply	happens	as	life	goes	
on:	new	ties	replace	the	old,	the	world	revolves	less	around	the	departed	per-
son”	(2016,	126).	However,	it	seems	to	me	that	working	through	is,	precisely,	
not	something	that	simply	happens	but	something	that	we	do.	
38.	 Indeed,	 something	 like	 this	 lies	 behind	 the	 notion	 of	 Vergangenheitsbewäl-
tigung	—	a	 very	 prominent	 notion	 in	 public	 discourse	 in	 Germany	 (which,	
via	Adorno,	who	 coined	 the	 term,	 goes	 back	 to	 Freud).	 The	German	 verb	
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does	not	involve	apprehending	a	teleological	structure	of	means	and	
ends	—	even	if,	as	a	matter	of	 fact,	grieving	 is	a	means	to	the	end	of	
coming	to	terms	with	our	loss.	Grief	is	neither	an	exercise	of	the	will,	
nor	is	it	responsive	to	practical	reasons.	Hence,	grief	is	not	work.	
Nonetheless,	 there	 is	 an	 insight	 in	 the	work	view.	The	 insight	 is	
that	 grief	 is	 (concomitant	 to)	 a	 process	 through	which	we	 come	 to	
terms	with	a	loss.	But	this	insight	has	to	be	captured	differently.	Grief	
is	best	understood	as	 akin	 to	 a	 judgment	with	 a	 temporally	 limited	
functional	role.	However,	the	functional	role	is	not	part	of	the	content	
of	grief.	The	 functional	 role	of	grief	 is	 like	 the	 functional	 role	of	 an	
over-confident	 judgment	during	a	 race:	 It	 contributes	 to	one’s	 ends,	
because	it	can	help	one	win	the	race,	but	not	through	the	content	of	
the	judgment.	The	functional	role	of	grief	—	be	it	detachment	from	the	
lost	object	or	healing	from	a	psychological	injury	—	is	essentially	sepa-
rated	from	the	understanding	embodied	in	grief.
So	we	are	back	to	the	double-vision:	In	grieving,	we	apprehend	our	
loss.	And	in	apprehending	ourselves	as	grieving,	we	apprehend	our-
selves	as	going	through	a	process	through	which	we	detach	ourselves	
from	the	lost	object.	But	we	have	not	found	a	way	to	unify	the	two	per-
spectives.	And	that,	I	will	now	argue,	is	no	accident:	it	is	a	structural	
feature	of	the	consciousness	that	is	involved	in	grief.	
7. Ineliminable Double Vision
I	think	that	reasons	for	grief	expire:	over	time,	as	we	grieve,	it	becomes	
not	wrong	to	grieve	less.	However,	I	also	think	that	there	is	no	good	
way	to	understand	this.	When	we	try	to	understand	it,	all	we	find	are	
reasons	of	the	wrong	kind.	
In	this	section,	I	will	offer	a	principled	rationale	for	why	this	is	so.	
To	do	 so,	 I	will	draw	on	 Jean-Paul	Sartre’s	 account	of	bad	 faith.	 Sar-
tre	famously	described	two	paradigmatic	ways	of	being	in	bad	faith.43 
The	first	is	to	treat	oneself	as	an	object	or,	to	put	it	 in	Sartre’s	terms,	
to	 identify	oneself	with	one’s	 “facticity”	—	like	a	gambler	who	 thinks	
43.	 Sartre	(1943/1956,	pt.1,	ch.2).	See	also	Moran	(2001,	esp.	77–83).	
these	activities	are	not	to	be	confused	with	the	emotion	of	grief.	These	
activities	may	be	considered	work,	but	grief,	the	emotion,	is	not.
There	 is	a	principled	reason	why	this	 is	so:	Work,	unlike	grief,	 is	
subject	to	the	will.	Thus,	we	can	apprehend	the	temporal	limitations	
of	work,	because	we	set	them.	But	we	cannot	apprehend	the	temporal	
limitations	of	grief,	because	we	don’t	set	them.	For	example,	when	we	
work	in	the	garden	with	the	goal	of	clearing	weeds	from	the	flower-
beds,	we	will	continue,	if	all	goes	well,	until	the	weeds	are	cleared.	But	
that	is	because	we	have	set	out	to	clear	the	weeds	from	the	flowerbeds:	
we	have	set	that	as	our	goal	and,	in	so	doing,	we	have	set	the	endpoint	
of	our	activity.	Since	it	is	up	to	us	to	clear	the	weeds	from	the	flower-
beds,	we	can	decide	whether	to	do	so,	when	to	do	so,	and	for	how	long	
to	do	so.	
But	 whether	 we	 grieve,	 when	 we	 grieve,	 and	 for	 how	 long	 we	
grieve	is	not	up	to	us.	In	this	respect,	grief	is	like	belief	—	a	persistent	
state	or	activity	that	constitutes	a	response	to	the	world,	rather	than	a	
goal-directed	activity	that	aims	at	change.40	Grief	is	an	activity	or	state	
that	we	can	apprehend	and	manage.41	But	the	understanding	involved	
in	grieving	is	not	goal-oriented	and	thus	does	not	include	a	temporal	
limitation.	The	end	of	grief	is	not	an	accomplishment,	and	we	do	not	
look	forward	to	it	as	an	accomplishment.42
A	corollary	observation	is	that	if	we	were	to	understand	our	own	
grief	as	work,	we	would	take	our	grief	to	be	responsive	to	reasons	that	
show	grieving	worthwhile:	When	we	work,	we	understand	ourselves	
to	be	responding	to	reasons	that	show	our	work	to	be	worthwhile.	But	
when	we	grieve,	we	do	not	understand	ourselves	as	responding	to	rea-
sons	that	show	our	grief	to	be	worthwhile.	Grieving,	unlike	working,	
40.	See	Boyle	(2011)	for	an	illuminating	account	of	belief	as	a	persistent	activity.	
41.	 See	Hieronymi	(2006)	on	managerial	control.	
42.	 Freud	writes,	 “Why	…	after	 [normal	mourning]	has	run	 its	course,	 is	 there	
no	hint	in	its	case	of	the	economic	condition	for	a	phase	of	triumph?	I	find	
it	impossible	to	answer	this	question	straight	away”	(Freud,	1917/1999,	255).	
I	venture	to	say:	Because	normal	mourning	does	not	aim	at	an	accomplish-
ment,	 there	 is	no	 sense	of	 accomplishment	at	 the	end	of	 it,	 and	hence	no	
triumph	over	a	job	well	done.
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psychology,	physiology,	history,	class	and	social	circumstances,	who,	
as	an	empirical	matter	of	fact,	act,	feel	and	believe	in	certain	ways	and	
for	 certain	purposes	—	and	 therein	exhibit	 a	kind	of	 alienation	 from	
ourselves.	But	we	cannot	bring	these	two	views	into	one	reconciled	
consciousness:	whenever	we	attend	to	one	of	them,	the	other	is,	as	it	
were,	blurry	in	the	background.46
Here	 is	how	I	would	articulate	 this	 in	 terms	of	my	experience	of	
grief	over	my	mother’s	death:	The	diminution	and	eventual	end	of	my	
grief	is	something	that	happened	to	me.	There	is	nothing	I	understood	
that	made	sense	of	the	diminution	of	grief	—	nothing	such	as	the	real-
ization	that	her	life	has	been	restored	or	that	her	death	has	ceased	to	
matter.	I	simply	stopped	grieving.	But	just	as	the	diminution	of	grief	
happened to	me,	it	seems	to	me	that	the	diminution	of	the	reasons	for	
grief	happened	 to	me.	 I	no	 longer	grieve	—	and	 this	 is	 somehow	all	
right.	It	would	be	a	mistake	for	me	to	suffer	persistent	grief.	
However,	even	 though	my	reasons	have	expired,	 I	do	not	under-
stand	their	expiration.	The	temporal	profile	of	my	reasons	for	grief	is	a	
fact	about	those	reasons,	but	it	is	not	a	fact	I	understand	in	apprehend-
ing	them.	It	is,	as	it	were,	the	backside	of	my	reasons.	I	don’t	think	this	
shows	 that	my	grief	was	not	 responsive	 to	my	reasons,	nor	 that	my	
current	absence	of	grief	is	a	failure	to	respond	to	my	reasons.	Rather,	
it	reveals	a	limitation	in	the	intelligibility	of	grief	—	a	limitation	that	is	
46.	Compare	Moran’s	(2001,	174–5)	discussion	of	the	rakehell	—	an	example	from	
a	novel	by	Kingsley	Amis:	A	married	man	spends	an	evening	with	another	
woman.	At	the	end	of	the	night,	he	feels	shame	for	his	betrayal.	But	then	he	
comes	to	see	something	praiseworthy	about	his	shame:	he	likes	himself	for	
being	“rather	a	good	chap	for	not	liking	[him]self	much”	(Moran	2001,	174).	
However,	 this	very	 reflection	distorts,	and	 indeed	changes,	his	moral	 judg-
ment	as	he	becomes	guilty	of	self-absorption.	This,	of	course,	constitutes	a	
further	moral	failure	—	and	one	that	is	not	lost	on	the	man,	which	results	in	
his	“not	 liking	[him]self	at	all	 for	 feeling	rather	a	good	chap”	(175).	The	rel-
evant	point,	for	present	purposes,	is	that	the	rakehell	cannot	fully	reconcile	
in	his	consciousness	both	the	wrong	he	has	committed	and	his	apprehension	
of	the	shame	he	feels	for	it.	On	Moran’s	view,	this	is	because	“an	emotional	
attitude	constitutes	something	closer	to	a	total	orientation	of	the	self,	the	in-
habiting	of	a	particular	perspective”	(181).	
that	the	fact	that	he’s	always	abandoned	resolutions	to	stop	gambling	
before	shows	that	he	will	likely	gamble	again,	because	he	is,	after	all,	
a	gambler.	The	second	is	to	ignore	one’s	facticity	and	identify	oneself	
entirely	with	one’s	freedom	—	like	a	gambler	who	takes	his	gambling	
history	to	be	irrelevant	to	the	question	of	whether	he	will	gamble	in	
the	future. 
Sartre’s	concern,	in	discussing	bad	faith,	is	primarily	with	agency.44 
However,	we	 can	 readily	 see	 that	 both	 kinds	 of	 bad	 faith	 are	 avail-
able	with	 regard	 to	our	emotions.	We	can	 treat	our	emotions	as	ob-
jects,	too:	We	do	so	when	we	take	a	theoretical	view	of	them	—	when	
we	see	them	as	a	process	that	we	undergo.	In	so	doing,	we	disregard	
our	 freedom.	Of	course,	 this	 is	not	 the	 freedom	we	enjoy	 in	action;	
it	 is	not	 freedom	of	 the	will.	But	 it	 is	 freedom	nonetheless,	because	
our	emotions	don’t	just	happen	to	us	but	are	our	responses	to	reasons,	
our	active	take	on	the	world.	(Indeed,	it	strikes	me	as	plausible	to	see	
reasons-responsiveness	as	criterial	of	freedom.)45
Yet	we	can	also	exhibit	something	like	the	second	kind	of	bad	faith:	
We	can	disregard	the	facticity	of	our	emotions.	We	do	so	when	we	take	
the	 hardline	 view	 and	hold	 that	 reasons	 don’t	 expire.	 The	 hardline	
view	offers	us	an	unrealistic	moral	psychology;	it	does	not	adequately	
take	into	account	the	psychological	reality	of	human	grief.	Thus	it	in-
dulges	in	an	unrealistic	sense	of	freedom.
In	light	of	this,	one	might	think	that	to	explain	the	temporality	of	
our	 reasons	 for	grief	 simply	 requires	an	explanation	of	how	we	can	
avoid	both	kinds	of	bad	faith.	But	here	is	where,	I	think,	we	encounter	
a	difficulty.	Our	freedom	and	our	 facticity	do	not	allow	for	reconcili-
ation:	On	Sartre’s	view,	we	cannot	comprehend	ourselves	as	freedom	
and	 facticity	at	once.	We	suffer	 from	an	 ineliminable	double	vision:	
We	can	apprehend	ourselves	as	free	and,	therein,	attend	to	the	world	
and	 respond	 to	 our	 reasons	—	be	 it	 our	 reasons	 for	 action	 or	 emo-
tion	 or	 belief.	 Or	 we	 can	 apprehend	 ourselves	 as	 creatures	 with	 a	
44.	 This	is	the	topic	of	Marušić	(2013;	2015).	
45.	 See	Wolf	(1990).
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itself.	For,	no	matter	how	welcome	the	death	of	a	loved	one	may	be,	it	
is	something	horrible.	
Death	 is	 unacceptable.	Nonetheless,	we	 realize	 that,	 in	 time,	we	
will	 accept	all	deaths,	even	 if	perhaps	we	don’t	 fully	 come	 to	 terms	
with	them.	And	this	is	somehow	all	right.	It	is	a	good	thing	that	we	do,	
but	that	is	not	what	makes	it	all	right.	I	am	at	a	loss	to	say	what	does,	
and	I	 think	that	 there	are	principled	reasons	why	it	 is	 impossible	to	
say	it.
How	big	a	problem	is	this?	I	think	it	is	potentially	immense:	Grief	
is	not	the	only	emotion	that	diminishes	over	time.	So	do	many	other	
emotions	—	most	 importantly	 anger.	We	 accommodate	 ourselves	 to	
loss,	 and	we	 accommodate	 ourselves	 to	 injustice.	 If,	 indeed,	 this	 is	
somehow	all	right	but	we	can’t	say	why,	how	can	we	properly	come	to	
terms	with	our	past?50
50.	This	paper	has	been	 long	 in	 the	making,	 and	 I	have	 incurred	many	debts	
of	 gratitude	 in	writing	 it.	The	paper	was	originally	 inspired	by	 a	 conversa-
tion	with	Matt	Boyle.	Ongoing	conversations	with	Matt,	as	well	as	Eli	Hirsch,	
Douglas	Lavin,	Amélie	Rorty	and	especially	Agnes	Callard	have	deeply	 in-
formed	 the	 paper.	 For	 helpful	 conversations,	 comments	 or	 suggestions,	 I	
am	also	indebted	to	Anke	Breunig,	Claudia	Blöser,	Rachel	Cohon,	Stephen	
Darwall,	 Sanja	 Dembić,	 James	Dreier,	 Jeremy	 Fantl,	William	 Flesch,	 Anna	
Flocke,	Rebekka	Gersbach,	Matthias	Haase,	Faye	Halpern,	Pamela	Hierony-
mi,	Thomas	Khurana,	Christian	Kietzmann,	Arden	Koehler,	Hilary	Kornblith,	
Richard	 Kraut,	 John	 Maier,	 Jennifer	 S.	 Marušić,	 Victoria	 McGeer,	 Richard	
Moran,	Oded	Na’aman,	Lucy	O’Brien,	Alejandro	Pérez	Carballo,	Philip	Pettit,	
Nicholas	Riggle,	Sebastian	Rödl,	Geoff	Sayre-McCord,	Kieran	Setiya,	David	
Shoemaker,	Matthew	 Silverstein,	 Jan	 Slaby,	Michael	 Smith,	Aarthy	Vaidya-
nathan,	Claudia	Vanea,	Katia	Vavova,	Jonathan	Way,	Stephen	White,	Daniel	
Whiting,	Susan	Wolf,	Palle	Yourgrau	and	several	anonymous	reviewers.	For	
helpful	questions	and	objections,	I	am	grateful	to	audiences	at	the	University	
of	Leipzig,	SUNY	Albany,	the	Humboldt	University	in	Berlin,	the	University	
of	Chicago,	the	NYU	Abu	Dhabi	Workshop	on	Normativity	and	Reasoning,	
with	special	thanks	to	Sarah	Paul	for	commenting	on	the	paper	there,	and	the	
Northwestern	University	Society	for	the	Theory	of	Ethics	and	Politics,	with	
special	thanks	to	Benjamin	Yelle	for	commenting	there.	I	am	grateful	for	a	fel-
lowship	from	the	Humboldt	Foundation	and	a	grant	from	the	Theodore	and	
Jane	Norman	Fund	at	Brandeis	that	enabled	me	to	write	and	revise	the	paper.	
I	dedicate	the	paper	to	Sanja,	with	love.
due	to	the	fact	that	I	am	embodied	and,	so,	conditioned	by	my	psychol-
ogy,	physiology,	history	and	social	circumstances.47
It	is	instructive	to	compare	the	diminution	and	end	of	grief	to	for-
getting:	 Both	 involve	 a	 change	 of	mind.	 But	we	 neither	 forget,	 nor	
cease	grieving,	 in light of	a	reason.	Forgetting,	 like	the	diminution	of	
grief,	is	something	that	happens	to	us.	And	it	happens	to	us	for	good	
reasons:	we	are	creatures	with	a	 limited	capacity	 for	memory	and	a	
limited	 capacity	 for	 suffering.	 But	 those	 are	 not	 reasons	 in	 light	 of	
which	we	forget	or	cease	grieving;	they	are	the	wrong	kind	of	reasons	
to	make	sense	of	forgetting	or	the	diminution	of	grief.	Both	are	limita-
tions	of	the	intelligibility	of	a	change	of	mind.	
8. Conclusion: The Unacceptability of Death
If	you	think	about	it,	the	death	of	a	loved	one	is	unacceptable.	Grief	is	
our	rejection	of	her	death.48	Grief,	put	in	words,	is	a	passionate,	“No!”
This	is	not	to	say	that	our	attitude	towards	death	is	always	a	whole-
hearted	rejection.	At	 least	some	of	 the	 time,	we	may	find	relief	 in	a	
loved	one’s	death	or	even	welcome	her	death	—	such	as	when	some-
one	suffers	from	a	harrowing	disease.	To	say	that	death	is	unacceptable	
is	thus	not	to	say	that	it	is	unwelcome,	nor	that	we	would	all-things-
considered	prefer	that	the	dead	loved	one	live	forever.	Eternal	life	is	
surprisingly	unattractive,	as	Williams	has	taught	us,	and	arguably	our	
mortality	is	a	condition	for	valuing	the	things	we	value.49	Rather,	to	say	
that	death	is	unacceptable	is	to	register	a	fundamental	objection	to	the	
human	condition	—	an	objection	that	 is	compatible	with	 the	affirma-
tion	of	many	other	aspects	of	the	human	condition,	 including	death	
47.	 It	is	an	important	philosophical	project,	which	goes	well	beyond	the	confines	
of	this	essay,	to	investigate	how	these	features	condition	the	rationality	of	our	
emotions.	See	especially	Rorty	(1978)	and	Wollheim	(1999),	who	emphasize	
the	importance	of	the	history	of	an	emotion.
48.	 By	rejection,	I	mean	the	contrary	of	what	Jay	Wallace	has	characterized	as	the	
attitude	of	affirmation	(2013).	
49.	 See	Williams’s	 (1973)	Makropulos	 case,	 and	 recent	 discussion	 by	 Scheffler	
(2013).
	 berislav	marušić Do Reasons Expire? An Essay on Grief
philosophers’	imprint	 –		19		– vol.	18,	no.	25	(december	2018)
On	the	 ‘Appropriateness’	of	Emotions.”	Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research	61,	65–90.
Deigh,	 John.	(1994).	 “Cognitivism	in	the	Theory	of	Emotions.”	Ethics 
104,	824–54.
de	Sousa,	Ronald.	(1987). The Rationality of Emotion.	Cambridge,	MA:	
MIT	Press.
Freud,	 Sigmund.	 (1917/1999).	 “Mourning	 and	 Melancholia.”	 In	 The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Vol.	14,	trans.	and	ed.	James	Strachey.	London:	The	Hogarth	Press,	
243–58.	
Gilbert,	Daniel,	et	al.	(1998).	“Immune	Neglect:	A	Source	of	Durabil-
ity	Bias	in	Affective	Forecasting.”	The Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology	75,	617–38.
Goldie,	Peter.	(2012).	The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind.	
Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.
Greenspan,	Patricia.	(1988). Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emo-
tional Justification.	New	York:	Routledge,	Chapman	and	Hall.
Greenspan,	 Patricia.	 (1981).	 “Emotions	 as	 Evaluations.”	 Pacific Philo-
sophical Quarterly	62,	158–69.
Gustafson,	Donald.	(1989).	“Grief”	Noûs	23,	457–79.
Hieronymi,	Pamela.	(2013).	“The	Use	of	Reasons	in	Thought	(and	the	
Use	of	Earmarks	in	Arguments).” Ethics 124,	114–27.
Hieronymi,	Pamela.	(2006).	“Controlling	Attitudes.”	Pacific Philosophi-
cal Quarterly	87,	45–74.
Hieronymi,	Pamela.	(2005).	“The	Wrong	Kind	of	Reason.”	The Journal 
of Philosophy	102,	437–57.
Higgins,	 Kathleen.	 (2013).	 “Love	 and	 Death.”	 In	 On Emotions: Philo-
sophical Essays,	ed.	John	Deigh.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	
Kahn,	Gilbert,	 ed.	 (1978).	Simone Weil: Philosophe, Historienne, et Mys-
tique.	Paris:	Aubier	Montaigne.
Keller,	 Simon.	 (2013).	 Partiality.	 Princeton,	 NJ:	 Princeton	 University	
Press.	
Kübler-Ross,	Elisabeth.	(1969).	On Death and Dying.	New	York:	Simon	
and	Schuster.
References:
American	 Psychiatric	 Association.	 (2013).  Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders:	 DSM-5.	 Washington,	 D.C:	 American	
Psychiatric	Association.
Anscombe,	G.E.M.	 (1957/2000).	 Intention.	 Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	
University	Press.
Bonanno,	George.	(2009).	The Other Side of Sadness: What the New Sci-
ence of Bereavement Tells Us about Life after Loss.	 New	 York:	 Basic	
Books.
Bonanno	George	et	al.	(2005).	“Grief	Processing	and	Deliberate	Grief	
Avoidance:	A	 Prospective	Comparison	 of	 Bereaved	 Spouses	 and	
Parents	 in	 the	United	States	and	 the	People’s	Republic	of	China.”	
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology	73,	86–98.
Boyle,	Matthew.	 (2011).	 “‘Making	Up	Your	Mind’	and	 the	Activity	of	
Reason.”	Philosophers’ Imprint	11,	1–24.
Bykvist,	Krister.	(2009).	“No	Good	Fit:	Why	the	Fitting	Attitude	Analy-
sis	of	Value	Fails.”	Mind	118,	1–30.
Callard,	Agnes.	(2018).	“The	Reason	to	be	Angry	Forever.”	In	The Moral 
Psychology of Anger,	 ed.	Owen	Flanagan	and	Myisha	Cherry.	 Lon-
don:	Rowman	and	Littlefield.
Camus,	Albert.	(1942/1988).	The Stranger.	Trans.	Matthew	Ward.	New	
York:	Vintage.
Cholbi,	Michael.	 (2017).	 “Grief’s	Rationality,	Backward	and	Forward.”	
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research	94,	255–72.
Coleman	 Jules	 and	Alexander	 Sarch.	 (2012).	 “Blameworthiness	 and	
Time.”	Legal Theory	18,	101–37.
Dancy,	 Jonathan.	(2000).	Practical Reality.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press.	
D’Arms,	Justin	and	Daniel	Jacobson.	(2003).	“The	Significance	of	Re-
calcitrant	 Emotion	 (or	 Anti-Quasijudgmentalism).”	 In	 Philosophy 
and the Emotions, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52,	ed.	An-
thony	Hatzimoysis.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	
D’Arms,	Justin	and	Daniel	Jacobson.	(2000).	“The	Moralistic	Fallacy:	
	 berislav	marušić Do Reasons Expire? An Essay on Grief
philosophers’	imprint	 –		20		– vol.	18,	no.	25	(december	2018)
Roberts,	Robert.	(1988).	“What	an	Emotion	Is:	A	Sketch.”	The Philosoph-
ical Review	97,	183–209.
Rorty,	Amélie.	(1978).	“Explaining	Emotions.”	The Journal of Philosophy 
75,	139–61.
Sacks,	Oliver.	(2007).	“The	Abyss.”	The New Yorker,	September	24,	2007.	 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/09/24/the-abyss.
Sartre,	Jean-Paul.	(1943/1956).	Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenologi-
cal Essay on Ontology.	Trans.	Hazel	E.	Barnes.	New	York:	Washing-
ton	Square	Press,	1956.
Sartre,	 Jean-Paul.	 (1938/2007).	Nausea.	Trans.	Lloyd	Alexander.	New	
York:	New	Directions.
Scanlon,	 T.M.	 (2013).	 “Interpreting	 Blame.”	 In	 Blame: Its Nature and 
Norms,	ed.	D.	Justin	Coates	and	Neal	A.	Tognazzini.	New	York:	Ox-
ford	University	Press.
Scanlon,	 T.M.	 (1998).	What We Owe to Each Other.	 Cambridge,	MA:	
Harvard	University	Press.
Scheffler,	 Samuel.	 (2013).	 Death and the Afterlife.	 Ed.	 Niko	 Kolodny.	
New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	
Schroeder,	Mark.	(2007).	Slaves of the Passions.	Oxford:	Oxford	Univer-
sity	Press.	
Singer,	Peter.	(1972).	“Famine,	Affluence	and	Morality.”	Philosophy and 
Public Affairs	1,	229–43.
Solomon,	Robert.	(2007).	True to Our Feelings.	New	York:	Oxford	Uni-
versity	Press.	
Solomon,	Robert.	(1976).	The Passions.	Indianapolis:	Hackett.
Wallace,	R.	Jay.	(2013).	The View from Here.	New	York:	Oxford	Univer-
sity	Press.
Wilkinson,	 Stephen.	 (2000).	 “Is	 ‘Normal	 Grief’	 a	 Mental	 Disorder?”	
Philosophical Quarterly	50,	289–304.
Williams,	Bernard.	(1981).	“Moral	Luck.”	In	Moral Luck and Other Essays.	
Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.
Williams,	Bernard.	(1973).	“The	Makropulos	Case:	Reflections	on	the	
Tedium	 of	 Immortality.”	 In	 Problems of the Self.	 Cambridge:	 Cam-
bridge	University	Press.
Maguire,	Barry.	 (Forthcoming).	 “There	Are	No	Reasons	 for	Affective	
Attitudes.”	Mind.
Marušić,	Berislav.	(In	preparation).	“Accommodation	to	Injustice.”	
Marušić,	Berislav.	(2015).	Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promis-
ing and Resolving.	Oxford,	UK:	Oxford	University	Press.
Marušić,	Berislav.	(2013).	“Promising	against	the	Evidence.”	Ethics 123,	
292–317.
Moller,	Dan.	(Forthcoming).	“Love	and	the	Rationality	of	Grief.”	In	The 
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Love,	 ed.	 Christopher	 Grau	 and	
Aaron	Smuts.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.
Moller,	Dan.	 (2007).	 “Love	and	Death.”	The Journal of Philosophy	 104,	
301–16.
Moran,	Richard.	 (2015).	The Story of My Life: Narrative and Self-Under-
standing.	Milwaukee,	WI:	Marquette	University	Press.	
Moran,	 Richard.	 (2001).	Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-
Knowledge.	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.
Nussbaum,	Martha.	(2016).	Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generos-
ity, Justice.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	
Nussbaum,	 Martha.	 (2001).  Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of 
Emotions.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.
Nussbaum,	Martha.	(1994).	The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in 
Hellenistic Ethics.	Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press.
O’Brien,	Lucy	and	Douglas	Lavin.	(In	preparation).	“Living	Historically.”
Pettit,	Philip	and	Michael	Smith.	(1990).	“Backgrounding	Desire.”	The 
Philosophical Review	99,	565–92.
Preston-Roedder,	Ryan	and	Erica	Preston-Roedder.	(2017).	“Grief	and	
Recovery.”	In	The Moral Psychology of Sadness,	ed.	Anna	Gotlib.	Lon-
don:	Rowman	and	Littlefield.
Prinz,	Jesse.	(2004).	Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion.	New	
York:	Oxford	University	Press.	
Proust,	Marcel.	(1919/1998).	In Search of Lost Time II: Within a Budding 
Grove.	 Trans.	 C.K.	Moncrieff,	 Terence	 Kilmartin	 and	D.J.	 Enright.	
New	York:	Modern	Library.
	 berislav	marušić Do Reasons Expire? An Essay on Grief
philosophers’	imprint	 –		21		– vol.	18,	no.	25	(december	2018)
Wittgenstein,	 Ludwig.	 (1953/2003).	 Philosophical Investigations,	 third	
edition.	Trans.	G.E.M.	Anscombe.	Oxford:	Blackwell,	2003.
Wolf,	Susan.	(1990).	Reason within Freedom.	New	York:	Oxford	Univer-
sity	Press.
Wollheim,	Richard.	(1999).	On the Emotions.	New	Haven:	Yale	Univer-
sity	Press.
Yourgrau,	Palle.	(2010).	Simone Weil.	London:	Reaktion	Books.
